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Abstract
Immunization against infectious diseases is the single factor that has had the most considerable impact on
world health. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primary
public health organization responsible for research, analysis, and fulfillment of immunization programs. A
small number of vaccine manufacturers produce all the pediatric vaccines required to fully immunize a child
against infectious diseases. To ensure adequate societal immunization coverage levels, the CDC negotiates the
prices of the vaccines sold in the public sector with vaccine manufacturers. The economic competition between
vaccine manufacturers and the impact of the negotiations between the CDC and the vaccine manufacturers
are of particular interest. This dissertation applies game theory and operations research techniques to
analyze the pricing strategies in the United States Pediatric vaccine market. The market is studied from four
different aspects. First, integer programming is applied to analyze pricing strategies for pediatric combination
vaccines by comparing the lowest overall cost formularies for a fixed cost of an injection. Specific emphasis
is placed on examining the price of combination vaccine Pentacel R© under different conditions. Second, the
market factors that impact the uptake of pediatric combination vaccines in the United States public sector
pediatric vaccine market are analyzed. Particularly, the direct competition between Pediarix R© and Pentacel
is studied considering the indirect presence of several market factors. Next, Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
price game is used to examine the prices of the monovalent vaccines in the United States pediatric vaccine
market. The proposed game captures oligopolistic interactions between symmetric, capacity-constrained
manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers with equal and limited production capacity) in a differentiated, single-
product market with linear demand. Vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse
medical events for that vaccine. Using the proposed game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed
for competing monovalent vaccines. Finally, The Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game is employed
to analyze the competition between asymmetric capacity-constrained manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers
with unequal and limited production capacities) producing differentiated products in a market with linear
demand. The competing vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse medical
events, the number of different antigens, and special advantages of those vaccines. Using the proposed game
ii
theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for competing monovalent and combination vaccines. The
results presented in this dissertation should appeal to the pediatric healthcare community, including federal
government officials (who negotiate the vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers) and vaccine manufacturers
(who seek effective pricing strategies).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The public health community considers immunization to be one of the most important medical advances of
the twentieth century [45]. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is
the primary public health organization with the national responsibility for research, analysis, and fulfillment
of pediatric immunization programs. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is an
independent panel of vaccine stakeholder representatives from the CDC, vaccine manufacturers, scientists,
and physician groups. The ACIP reviews technical data on new vaccines, and then makes recommendations
after the vaccines are approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for sale in the United States.
The ACIP is also responsible for adding the vaccines to the Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule
(RCIS) (see Figure 1.1 from [14]). The RCIS represents the recommended sequence and timing of pediatric
vaccines to protect children from pediatric diseases. Over the past two decades, the complexity of the RCIS
has grown, demanding children to endure numerous vaccine injections over the first two years of life.
Figure 1.1: 2012 Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (RCIS)
There are a limited number of pharmaceutical companies who manufacture vaccines for the United States
pediatric vaccine market. To ensure adequate societal immunization coverage levels, the CDC launched the
Vaccines for Children (VFC) program in 1994, which protects eligible children against vaccine-preventable
diseases at no cost. The volume of the vaccines administered through the VFC program is more than half of
all pediatric vaccines administered in the United States [27]. Furthermore, the VFC program has extended
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the market for the vaccine manufacturers by immunizing the children who would normally have not been
vaccinated, resulting in higher dose sales of pediatric vaccines [27]. These give some leverage to the CDC
to negotiate vaccine prices, sold through the VFC program, with the vaccine manufacturers [27]. During
negotiations with vaccine manufacturers, the CDC is seeking effective pricing strategies to stay within the
federal budget allocated to the VFC program. The United States pediatric vaccine market has two sectors;
the public sector (managed via the VFC program), in which the vaccine prices are determined by CDC
vaccine contracts and the private sector, in which vaccine prices are determined by vaccine manufacturers
directly. Pediatric vaccines purchased at the public sector account for approximately 57% of total pediatric
purchases by volume [15]. Private vaccine providers, who are not registered as VFC Program Providers,
cannot purchase the vaccines through federal contract prices, and as such, purchase the vaccines at private
sector prices (typically higher than the federal contract prices). The private sector prices are reported by
vaccine manufacturers to the CDC [22] . The focus of this dissertation is on the public sector of the United
States pediatric vaccine market, though the methodology employed could be adapted to separately analyze
the private sector.
To fully satisfy the current RCIS [14], a child may require up to 24 separate injections (not including
Rotavirus, Influenza, Hepatitis A, and Meningococcal), using only monovalent vaccines [59]. A monovalent
vaccine immunizes against a single disease in one injection. However, if a vaccine contains two or more
antigens, with any of these antigens not available as a vaccine on its own, it is still referred to as monovalent
vaccine in this dissertation (e.g., DTaP contains antigens against diseases diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis,
but it is referred to as monovalent vaccine). A combination vaccine immunizes against multiple diseases, with
one or more of these antigens available as a vaccine on its own. To satisfy the RCIS, different formularies with
different costs may be used. A formulary is a set of pediatric vaccines stocked to satisfy the immunization
needs for a pediatric population cohort, as defined by a given set of immunization requirements.
Vaccines are said to compete when two or more vaccine manufacturers produce the same vaccine or
vaccines that contain the same antigen that can be administered to satisfy the immunization requirements
in a given time period. There are four competitive antigens: DTaP, HepB, Hib, and IPV. This dissertation
focuses on diseases for which there are competing vaccines produced by different pharmaceutical companies.
In the United States, three pharmaceutical companies (Merck & Co., Inc., GlaxoSmithKline plc, and Sanofi
Pasteur) manufacture all the competing vaccines. Several combination pediatric vaccines have been licensed
for use within the United States. DTaP-HepB-IPV (Pediarix R©), the first pentavalent vaccine that gained
FDA approval in the United States, entered the market in December 2002, and until the summer of 2008,
was the only pentavalent combination vaccine available. In June 2008, the FDA approved a second pentava-
lent combination vaccine, DTaP-IPV/HIB (Pentacel R©). The focus of this dissertation is on the pricing of
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three monovalent vaccines: DTaP, HepB, Hib and two combination vaccines Pediarix and Pentacel. Note
that in this dissertation, the two combination vaccines Pediarix and Pentacel, unlike other monovalent and
combination vaccines, are indicated by their registered trademark name. According to the RCIS structure,
Pediarix and Pentacel are not well suited to be simultaneously used in a single formulary. The market will
gravitate towards the combination vaccine which provides the best value (e.g., yields the lowest overall cost
formulary (LOCF), defined as the set of vaccines that satisfies the RCIS at the lowest overall minimum
formulary cost). Hence, from the perspective of a healthcare provider, the important question to ask is:
what set of vaccines fully satisfies the RCIS at the minimum overall cost, given a fixed cost of an injection
(defined as a constant vaccine administration cost)?
Chapter 3 of this dissertation answers this question by analyzing the pricing strategies for pediatric
combination vaccines based on the LOCF for a fixed cost of an injection. Particular emphasis is placed on
examining the price of Sanofi Pasteur Pentacel under different conditions. The main contribution of Chapter
3 is to provide the lowest overall cost formularies for different prices of Pentacel as well as other Sanofi
Pasteur vaccines. The resulting analysis shows that Pentacel could have been more competitively priced
compared to the combination vaccine Pediarix, for federal contract prices in 2009, 2010, and 2011. This
Chapter also proposes the lowest overall cost formularies when monovalent vaccines shortages occur.
Chapter 4 explores market factors that impact the uptake of pediatric combination vaccines in the United
States public sector pediatric vaccine market. Specific emphasis is placed on examining how Pediarix and
Pentacel earned a place in the lowest overall cost formulary during 2009-2012. Direct competition between
Pediarix and Pentacel is driven by the indirect presence of the Merck Hib vaccine and the RCIS requirement
for a HepB birth dose. The resulting analysis suggests that Pentacel would never have earned a place in
the lowest overall cost formulary for federal contract prices in 2009-2012 for any cost of an injection unless
the Merck Hib Advantage was ignored and the HepB Birth Dose Administration Cost was recognized by
healthcare providers in designing the lowest overall cost formularies.
Over the past decade, numerous economic and regulatory factors and high research and development
costs of vaccines have made vaccine manufacturing less profitable for vaccine manufacturers, resulting in
many of them exiting the market [57]. One consequence of this situation is that production problems often
translate into vaccine shortages in the market. Since maintaining high immunization levels is a vital societal
need, the CDC is motivated to sustain an adequate supply of vaccines through public health policies that
encourage new companies to enter the market [57]. Due to the limited profits , the CDC is required to provide
sufficient financial incentives for the vaccine manufacturers in order to ensure a certain level of profits for them
and to maintain a high immunization level in the society [57]. Therefore, during negotiations with vaccine
manufacturers, the CDC is seeking effective pricing strategies to stay within the federal budget allocated to
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the VFC program, while providing financial incentives for the vaccine manufacturers to maintain the current
supply of vaccines.
Game theory methods have been applied to analyze the pediatric vaccine prices in the United States
pediatric vaccine market. Nash equilibrium is a robust solution methodology applied to study the pricing
behavior of the vaccine manufacturers. Oligopoly theory analyzes the determination of prices in markets with
a limited number of competitors. Central issues in oligopoly theory, such as the solution concept, defined
as rules which predict how each competitor selects prices or production quantities, and the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibria, are raised by Cournot [28], Bertrand [2], and Edgeworth [35]. Their analyses are
seen as precursors to the development of modern game theory tenets by von Neumann and Morgenstern [72]
and Nash [51]. Other significant contributions to oligopoly theory include Chamberlin [26], Hotelling [41], and
Robinson [61], each of whom emphasize the impact of product differentiation. The frameworks introduced by
Cournot (in 1838) and by Bertrand (in 1883) are based upon the strategic variable of interest. In the Cournot
framework [28], the strategic variable is the production quantity chosen independently and simultaneously by
each manufacturer. The production quantities will then result in a price using the supply and demand systems
in the market. In this framework, Nash equilibrium occurs when the production quantity levels selected
by each manufacturer maximize their profits, given the production quantity levels selected by the other
manufacturers. In the Bertrand framework [2], the strategic variable is the price of the homogeneous product
chosen independently and simultaneously by each manufacturer. The prices of the homogeneous product
then result in a production quantity using the supply and demand systems in the market. In this framework,
an equilibrium occurs when the prices selected by each manufacturer maximize their profits, given the
prices selected by the other manufacturers. There are three main assumptions associated with the Bertrand
framework [68]. The first assumption considers unlimited production capacities for each manufacturer,
implying that each manufacturer can satisfy the entire market demand. The second assumption considers no
product differentiation, implying that all the manufacturers’ products are substitutable. The last assumption
considers a single interaction between the manufacturers, implying a static competition.
Since Bertrand introduced this framework, game theorists have come to realize that the assumptions
made in the Bertrand framework do not always hold true in practical applications. Edgeworth [35] intro-
duces a framework, called the Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in which the price competition among two
capacity-constrained manufacturers is studied. In Bertrand-Edgeworth competition the first assumption of
the Bertrand framework is relaxed. In Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, the existence of equilibria can be
guaranteed exclusively in mixed strategies [71]. Hotelling [41], Chamberlin [26], and Robinson [61] study
product differentiation, where manufacturers compete on price. While Hotelling explores heterogeneity in
terms of location, Chamberlin and Robinson independently developed the monopolistic competition model
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[71]. In Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition, capacity-constrained manufacturers compete on price
over the sale of differentiated products (i.e., the first and second assumptions of the Bertrand framework are
relaxed).
The United States pediatric vaccine market represents a market with a small number of pharmaceutical
companies producing pediatric vaccines. The prices of the vaccines sold in the public sector are negotiated by
the CDC every year. Clearly, the pharmaceutical companies have limited production capacities in producing
the vaccines. Moreover, the competing vaccines are differentiated based on their medical adverse events,
number of different antigens, and special advantages of those vaccines. Therefore to determine equilibrium
vaccine prices, Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition provides an appropriate framework.
The analysis in Chapter 5 focuses on studying the United States pediatric vaccine market using Bertrand-
Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition. The price competition among symmetric capacity-constrained manu-
facturers, within a market with oligopoly setting and linear demand, is studied. Here, the term symmetric
capacity-constrained manufacturers refers to manufacturers with equal production capacity. The assumption
of equal production capacity among manufacturers facilitates the tractability of the equilibria. Nash equi-
librium is the solution concept applied to study the formulated game [51], which is the key solution concept
in oligopoly pricing models [71]. Both pure and mixed strategy equilibrium are considered in analyzing the
pediatric vaccine market. This analysis proves that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists if the capacities
of the manufacturers are at their extreme. For the other capacity values, the mixed strategy equilibrium
is completely characterized. Using the Bertrnad-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition, the equilibrium prices
of each vaccine, in both pure and mixed strategy, are computed. The results indicate that the equilibrium
prices for monovalent vaccines are generally lower than the federal contract prices. The numerical results
provide a lower bound and an upper bound for the vaccine equilibrium prices in the public sector and a
lower bound for vaccine equilibrium prices in the private sector. The results illustrate the importance of
several model parameters such as the degree of product differentiation, the number of manufacturers, and
the market demand on the equilibrium prices. The analysis highlights the importance of degree of product
differentiation on equilibrium price. If the total capacity of the vaccine manufacturers is limited, equilibrium
prices increase as the degree of product differentiation increases. On the other hand, if the vaccine man-
ufacturers are able to meet the entire market demand, equilibrium prices increase up to a point and then
decrease as the degree of product differentiation increases.
Chapter 6 completely characterizes the unique pure strategy equilibrium in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-
Chamberlin competition in an oligopoly setting with linear demand and asymmetric capacity-constrained
manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers with unequal production capacities). In addition, the complete charac-
terization of mixed strategy equilibrium is provided in a duopoly setting with linear demand. Some general
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properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium in an oligopoly setting with linear demand are discussed. The
results indicate that the pure strategy equilibrium exists if the production capacity of all manufacturers are
at their extremes. For the capacity regions where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium. In a duopoly setting, the distribution functions of the mixed strategy equilibrium for
both manufacturers are provided. It is shown that the support of both distribution functions is unique. The
analysis determines the vaccine equilibrium prices in the United States pediatric vaccine market by applying
the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition to a market with asymmetric capacity constrained manu-
facturers producing differentiated products. The numerical results indicate that the public sector prices of
the pediatric vaccines are higher than the equilibrium prices of those vaccines. The model is employed to
analyze the pricing of pediatric vaccines once the shortage of any vaccine occurs. The results highlight the
importance of essential model parameters such as market demand and the degree of product differentiation
on equilibrium price of the vaccines.
The resulting equilibrium prices of the vaccines should provide insights to the CDC officials, who negotiate
the vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers, and to the vaccine manufacturers who investigate practical
pricing strategies.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter reviews the operations research and game theory literature related to the analysis of pricing
strategies in the United States pediatric vaccine market. In addition, the game theory literature related to
the game theoretic approaches used in this dissertation is reviewed.
2.1 Applications of Game Theory and Operations Research
on Pediatric Vaccine Market Pricing
Pediatric vaccine market pricing has not been broadly studied in the literature. Weniger et al.[73] and Ja-
cobson et al.[43] introduced a vaccine selection algorithm which solves for the LOCF that satisfies the RCIS
using an integer programming algorithm. A vaccine selection algorithm is introduced in [44] to compare the
prices of Pediarix and Pentacel in 2003, prior to Pentacel entering the market, by examining their maximal
prices (defined as the highest price for which a vaccine earns a place in the LOCF) at several fixed cost of
an injection values. Robbins and Jacobson [57] introduce the Monopsonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing and
Purchasing Problem, which seeks pediatric vaccine prices and purchase quantities that ensure a birth cohort
is fully immunized according to the RCIS at an overall minimum cost, while also ensuring that vaccine
manufacturers each attain a certain profit level. Robbins et al. [59] applies the vaccine selection algorithm
introduced in [73] and [43] to investigate a pharmaceutical company’s pricing strategy for pediatric com-
bination vaccines. The main contribution of [59] is to provide a methodology for evaluating two partially
overlapping combination vaccines, Pediarix and Pentacel, based on the price and uncertain cost of an injec-
tion. Furthermore, the analysis in [59] addresses how a pharmaceutical company should price such a vaccine
in order to maximize its expected revenue per child, which quantifies the amount of revenue the pharma-
ceutical company can expect to earn per child fully immunized according to the RCIS. While comparing
the formularies, the focus of [59] is on maximizing the expected revenue per child for each pharmaceutical
company. However, this dissertation (see Chapters 3 and 4) analyzes different formularies by focusing on
minimization of the total cost of each formulary. The costs that are minimized include the purchase price
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of individual vaccines, the vaccine preparation cost, and the cost of an injection. The purchase prices of
individual vaccines (federal contract prices) are available via the CDC (see [18], [19], [20] and [21]). Vaccine
preparation costs for vial and syringes are $0.75 and $0.25 per dose, respectively (see [73] and [43]). The
cost of an injection is a subjective value [73]. It is typically a function of the economic environment of the
pediatric patient population served by a healthcare provider. Many studies treat the cost of an injection
as a constant. However, treating it as an uncertain value with a probabilistic distribution is reasonable. In
this dissertation, three discrete values ($6, $10, and $14) are considered for the cost of an injection. These
values are based on the probability distribution used for the cost of an injection in Robbins et al.[59]. The
four antigens or antigen sets of interest in this dissertation are DTaP, HepB, Hib, and IPV and the six time
periods of interest are birth-month, month 2, month 4, month 6, month 12-18, and year 4-6. The analysis
in this dissertation uses only federal contract prices (typically lower than private sector prices) which covers
57% of the United States market; however, the same method could be applied using private sector vaccine
prices. Freed et al. [39] study the private sector vaccine prices and provide the range of prices paid by
providers in private sector by conducting a cross-sectional survey.
Pricing the vaccines in the United States pediatric vaccine market by employing game theoretic models,
has not been extensively studied in the literature. Robbins et al. [60] use a Bertrand oligopoly pricing model
to analyze the United States pediatric vaccine market. Their model determines oligopolistic interactions
between manufacturers with unlimited capacities in a homogeneous multiple product market. Chapters
5 and 6 of this dissertation seek pricing strategies of the vaccines in the United States pediatric vaccine
market by applying game theoretic models. Chapter 5 differs from [60] by analyzing the United States
pediatric vaccine manufacturing market using Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition, which allows
for both capacity constraints and product differentiation in the price game. Using this model, the equi-
librium prices of each vaccine, in both pure and mixed strategy, are computed. The results indicate that
the equilibrium prices for monovalent vaccines are generally lower than the federal contract prices. Chapter
6 determines the vaccine equilibrium prices in the United States pediatric vaccine market by applying the
Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition to a market with asymmetric capacity constrained manufac-
turers producing differentiated products. The numerical results indicate that the public sector prices of the
pediatric vaccines are higher than the equilibrium prices of those vaccines. The model is employed to analyze
the pricing of pediatric vaccines once the shortage of any vaccine occurs.
8
2.2 Game Theory
A review of the existing game theory literature motivates the need for a model that captures oligopoly
price competition among capacity-constrained manufacturers producing differentiated products. At first,
studies analyzing the price competition among capacity constrained manufacturers only examine homoge-
neous products (i.e., Bertrand-Edgeworth competition). Bertrand-Edgeworth competition is built upon the
Bertrand price competition and the Edgeworth model [35], which acknowledges the effect of production
capacity constraints. Levitan and Shubik [48] examine a duopolistic homogeneous product market in which
two manufacturers compete, with price as the strategic variable, and are limited by equal capacity con-
straints. Kreps and Scheinkman [47] characterize the equilibria in a duopoly capacity and price game where
the capacity of the two manufacturers are not necessarily equal. Kreps and Scheinkman [47] assume that
homogeneous goods are produced at a constant and identical unit variable cost up to some fixed capacity.
They also assume the demand to be non-increasing and concave. Osborne and Pitchik [55] consider the same
assumptions of the Kreps and Scheinkman [47] model with non-concave demand. Deneckere and Kovenock
[32] consider the same assumptions of the Kreps and Scheinkman [47] model and acknowledge differences in
unit cost among the manufacturers. Analyzing equilibria under oligopoly, Vives [70] studies the case where
manufacturers are limited by equal capacities, with concave demand and constant and identical unit costs.
Hirata [40] and De Francesco and Salvadori [38] analyze a triopoly with concave demand, where [38] dis-
cusses a complete representation of mixed strategy equilibria. No results have been reported in the literature
that characterizes the mixed strategy equilibria in an oligopolistic Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with
asymmetric capacity constrained manufacturers.
In addition to the issue of capacity constraint, price competition among product-differentiated manufac-
turers has recently gained interest among game theorists. Chamberlin [26] and Robinson [61] independently
discuss imperfect competition with product differentiation initiated from a demand system. This dissertation
follows the Chamberlin-Robinson path and considers the product differentiation introduced in the demand
system. The type of demand system is therefore essential. Benassy [1] studies the Bertrand-Edgeworth-
Chamberlin model with a general demand system, in which it is proven that a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist if the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large. Canoy [3] studies the same model
as a parameterized duopoly in which a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist if the products are suffi-
ciently similar. However, Benassy [1] and Canoy [3] do not analyze the characterization of mixed strategy
equilibrium. Sinitsyn [67] takes a step forward and analyzes the equilibria (in both pure and mixed strategy)
in a duopolistic Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition with logit demand for both symmetric and
asymmetric manufacturers. However, logit demand is not applicable to the United States pediatric vaccine
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market as it incorporates the independence of irrelevant alternatives property, which is often violated in
vaccine markets [30].
No results have been reported in the literature to characterize and study the existence of equilibria
in pure and mixed strategies for the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition in an oligopoly with
quadratic utility and linear demand. This dissertation explores equilibria in the model of a price setting
oligopoly with manufacturers having finite production capacities and producing differentiated products. The
manufacturers are assumed to follow a linear demand. Chapter 5 completely characterizes the unique pure
strategy equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition
in an oligopoly setting with linear demand and symmetric capacity-constrained manufacturers. The results
prove that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists if the capacities of the manufacturers are at their
extreme. For the other capacity values, the mixed strategy equilibrium is completely characterized. Chapter
6 completely characterizes the unique pure strategy equilibrium in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition in an oligopoly setting with linear demand and asymmetric capacity-constrained manufacturers.
In addition, the complete characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium is provided in a duopoly setting
with linear demand. Some general properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium in an oligopoly setting
with linear demand are discussed. The results indicate that the pure strategy equilibrium exists if the
production capacity of all manufacturers are at their extremes. For the capacity regions where no pure
strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium. In a duopoly setting, the distribution
functions of the mixed strategy equilibrium for both manufacturers are provided. It is shown that the support
of both distribution functions is unique.
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Chapter 3
Pricing Strategies for Combination
Pediatric Vaccines based on the
Lowest Overall Cost Formulary
In 2010 and 2011, for the four competitive antigens DTaP, HepB, Hib, and IPV, the three pharmaceutical
companies competed pairwise with each other over the sale of eight monovalent and four combination vaccines
(Table 3.1). However in 2009, when combination vaccine DTaP/Hib manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur was
available under federal contract, they competed over the sale of eight monovalent and five combination
vaccines (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: 2009, 2010, and 2011 CDC licensed pediatric vaccines
by pharmaceutical company (competitive antigens)
Merck GlaxoSmithKline Sanofi Pasteur
HepB DTaP DTaP
Hib Hib Hib
Hib-HepB HepB IPV
DTaP-IPV DTaP/Hib (available only in 2009)
DTaP-HepB-IPV (Pediarix) DTaP-IPV/HIB (Pentacel)
This chapter analyzes pricing strategies for pediatric combination vaccines based on the LOCF across
three years (2009, 2010, and 2011) for a fixed cost of an injection by applying the vaccine selection algorithm
introduced in [73] and [43]. Differences between the formularies in the three years arise from differences in
the prices of the vaccines, the introduction of new vaccines, and/or the discontinuation of vaccines. These
discussions inform pharmaceutical companies on pricing strategies so that they may earn a greater profit
in the future. The chapter also studies the sensitivity analyses on the price of Pentacel under different
conditions in order for it to earn a place in the LOCF. The conditions under which the sensitivity analyses
are done include when extraimmunization is not permitted for HepB vaccine, when extraimmunization is
permitted for HepB, and when the savings resulting from switching formularies is significant. Trends in
changes in the price of Pentacel for any cost of an injection over these three years (2009, 2010, and 2011)
are compared. A sensitivity analysis on the prices of all the vaccines of Sanofi Pasteur is presented to allow
the company to make appropriate pricing decisions. The chapter also reports the LOCF when there is a
shortage of one monovalent vaccine.
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The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 gives an overview of the model and describes all the
necessary assumptions for its analysis. Section 3.2 reports the results and discussion and is divided into
the following sections; Section 3.2.1 reports the LOCF for federal contract prices across the three years
(2009, 2010, and 2011). Section 3.2.2 studies the maximal prices of Pentacel under different conditions.
The conditions are either allowing or not allowing extraimmunization for HepB. Section 3.2.3 discusses the
maximal prices of Pentacel and the resulting LOCFs for a fixed cost of an injection, which deliver savings
for state public health agencies. Section 3.2.4 analyzes market conditions under which there is a shortage
of one of the monovalent vaccines for each of the four monovalent vaccines. The LOCFs for a fixed cost of
an injection are introduced in each case. Section 3.3 presents concluding comments and limitations of the
study.
3.1 Methods: Model Overview and Assumptions
A vaccine selection algorithm, based on an integer programing model, is proposed in [73] and [43] to solve for
the LOCF needed to satisfy the RCIS. The model has been updated separately to consider all monovalent
and combination vaccines that were licensed in the United States and under federal contracts 2009, 2010,
2011, for purchase by the CDC for use in United States public-sector immunization programs (Table 3.2
([18], [19] and [20])).
Table 3.2: Competitive vaccines used in the vaccine selection algorithm (Federal contracts 2009-2011)
Vaccine Manufacturer Packaging Subtotal Subtotal Subtotal
cost/dose cost/dose cost/dose
(Federal contract (Federal contract (Federal contract
2009) 2010) 2011)
DTaP Sanofi Pasteur Vial $14.00 $14.00 $14.00
DTaP GlaxoSmithKline Syringe $14.00 $14.50 $15.10
DTaP-IPV GlaxoSmithKline Syringe $32.50 $33.00 $34.50
Pediarix GlaxoSmithKline Syringe $49.00 $50.00 $51.40
DTaP/Hib Sanofi Pasteur Vial $28.06 - -
Pentacel Sanofi Pasteur Vial $52.24 $51.45 $53.30
IPV Sanofi Pasteur Vial $11.76 $12.49 $12.72
HepB GlaxoSmithKline Syringe $10.00 $10.50 $10.60
HepB Merck Vial $10.75 $11.00 $11.25
Hib-HepB Merck Vial $29.55 $30.25 $30.25
Hib Merck Vial $12.04 $12.261 $12.39
Hib Sanofi Pasteur Vial $9.41 $9.58 $9.75
Hib GlaxoSmithKline Vial $9.41 $9.41 $9.73
Note that in order to fully satisfy the RCIS, one requires several monopoly vaccines (i.e., vaccines which
are produced by only a single manufacturer) such as measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) and Pneumo-
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coccal Conjugate 7-valent (PCV7). However, monopoly vaccines are not included in the analysis, since no
competition occurs and the vaccine selection algorithm trivially selects the single product available.
Four objective function cost components determine the overall cost for a formulary: 1. Purchase price
of individual vaccines, 2. Vaccine preparation cost, 3. Clinic visit cost, and 4. Vaccine administration cost
(i.e., the cost of an injection). The subtotal cost of a vaccine listed in Table 3.2 is the sum of the purchase
price and vaccine preparation cost. In this chapter, the subtotal cost of the vaccines in Table 3.2 is referred
to as the original prices of the vaccines. Vaccine preparation costs for vial and syringes were $0.75 and $0.25
per dose, respectively (see [73] and [43] for details). The cost of a clinic visit remains the same ($40) as
in previous studies ([73] and [43]). However, since all relevant time periods require a visit, this value does
not impact the selection of the LOCF and is excluded from the total cost. The total cost is referred to the
subtotal cost plus the cost of an injection. The cost of an injection is a subjective value [59]. Many studies
including [44] and [64] treat the cost of an injection as a constant. However, treating it as an uncertain value
with a probabilistic distribution is reasonable. In the current analysis, three discrete values ($6, $10, and
$14) are considered for the cost of an injection.
The four vaccine components of interest in this study are DTaP, HepB, Hib, and IPV. The six time
periods of interest are birth-month, month 2, month 4, month 6, month 12-18, and year 4-6. A vaccine can
only be administered for diseases and in time periods for which it has been licensed by the FDA [37]. The
following ACIP recommendations are used in this study:
1. Administering Merck Hib in months 2 and 4 implies that the month 6 dose is not required [14].
2. DTaP-IPV is licensed for use as the fifth dose of the DTaP vaccine series and the fourth dose of the
IPV series in year 4-6 for children whose previous DTaP vaccine doses were GlaxoSmithKline DTaP
and/or Pediarix for the first three doses and GlaxoSmithKline DTaP for the fourth dose [11].
3. Monovalent HepB birth dose is administered to all newborns prior to hospital discharge.
4. If monovalent HepB is used for doses after the birth dose, a dose at month 4 is not needed.
5. DTaP/Hib should not be used for primary immunization, but can be used as boosters after any Hib
has been administered after month 12.
6. GlaxoSmithKline Hib is indicated for active immunization as a booster dose for the prevention of
invasive disease caused by Haemophilus influenzae type b. GlaxoSmithKline Hib is approved for use
in children 15 months through 4 years of age (prior to the fifth birthday).
7. According to [8], manufacturer brand matching is recommended for months 2, 4, and 6 doses of DTaP,
whereby each of the doses of DTaP for the pertinent three time periods must be of the same brand.
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However, a newer study[11] recommends the manufacturer brand matching for all the time periods
birth-month, months 2, 4, 6, 12-18, and year 4-6. In this chapter, the manufacturer brand matching
for all the time periods is enforced.
In addition to these recommendations, some additional assumptions are made in this chapter:
1. Extraimmunization with additional doses beyond those required is not permitted.
2. Pediarix and Pentacel are only permitted in months 2, 4, and 6.
3. Formularies in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are present are not considered.
Although Pediarix and Pentacel are permitted in months 12-18, the foregoing assumption 2 is made due
to the HepA, MMR, and Varicella requirements in that time slot (which are monopoly vaccines, and hence,
are not included in this study). Also the foregoing assumption 3 is made due to a belief that healthcare
providers prefer either Pediarix or Pentacel. Considering assumptions 2 and 3, only practical and feasible
formularies are studied in this section.
3.2 Results and Discussion
This section reports results of the vaccine selection algorithm to gain insights into the United States pediatric
vaccine market based on the assumptions of section 3.1.
3.2.1 Lowest Overall Cost Formulary
The vaccine selection algorithm solves for the LOCF for a fixed cost of an injection. The focus is on finding
the LOCFs and their associated costs across three consecutive years (2009, 2010, and 2011) based on the
prices in Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 describes two LOCFs for the United States pediatric vaccine market in 2009. The Monovalent
and DTaP/Hib (MOT) Formulary (in this section, the abbreviated names of the formularies are based on
the registered trademarks of the vaccines) is the LOCF for the $6 cost of an injection. This formulary
uses all monovalent vaccines to satisfy the RCIS, with the exception of DTaP/IPV in months 12-18. The
monovalent vaccines do well at lower costs of an injection because the intrinsic premiums associated with
the combination vaccines have not yet been overcome by the cost of an injection [59]. For this formulary,
DTaP/IPV is priced ($28.06, including preparation cost) close to the sum of its component monovalent
vaccines ($14 + $9.41 = $23.41, including preparation cost). In this formulary, two injections of the Merck
Hib monovalent vaccine are used, which eliminates the requirement for the Hib dosage in month 6, which
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Table 3.3: Lowest overall cost formularies (2009)
Monovalent and DTaP/Hib
(MOT) Formulary
Cost of injection: $6
Total cost: $269.18
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 Hib
Month 4 Hib
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 HepB
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV
Month 4 DTaP, IPV
Month 6 DTaP, IPV
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
2-shot Pediarix
(2PX) Formulary
Cost of injection: $10 ($14)
Total cost: $313.75 ($353.75)
Vaccine
-
Hib
Hib
-
-
-
HepB
Pediarix
DTaP
Pediarix
DTaP, Hib
DTaP-IPV
-
-
IPV
-
-
-
costs less compared to the competing GlaxoSmithKline Hib andSanofi Pasteur Hib monovalents (although the
GlaxoSmithKline Hib and Sanofi Pasteur Hib are less expensive, they require three doses versus two Merck
Hib, and hence, are not as cost effective). Out of GlaxoSmithKline vaccines, only its monovalent HepB
is selected since it is less expensive than the competing Merck HepB monovalent. The GlaxoSmithKline
DTaP monovalent subtotal cost is equal to the Sanofi Pasteur DTaP monovalent; however, in the MOT
formulary, GlaxoSmithKline DTaP is not selected because of DTaP manufacturer brand matching. Sanofi
Pasteur DTaP monovalent is used because of the selection of DTaP/IPV in months 12-18. Since Pediarix
cannot earn a place in this formulary, the Sanofi Pasteur IPV monovalent becomes a monopoly vaccine and
is trivially selected for all four doses.
The 2-shot Pediarix (2PX) Formulary is the LOCF for the $10 and $14 costs of an injection. This
formulary is so named because of the two injections of Pediarix in months 2 and 6. The $10 and $14 costs
of an injection are sufficiently high for Pediarix to earn a place in the LOCF. GlaxoSmithKline replaces its
own two HepB monovalent in month 2 and month 6 with two doses of Pediarix. The economic value of
Pediarix compared to Pentacel allows GlaxoSmithKline to compete for all the DTaP doses in order to satisfy
the DTaP manufacturer brand matching. Since GlaxoSmithKline DTaP or Pediarix are used for months 2,
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4, and 6, and GlaxoSmithKline DTaP is used for months 12-18, DTaP-IPV can earn a place in the LOCF
as a booster for months 48-72.
Table 3.4 describes the LOCF in 2010. The Monovalent (MO) Formulary is the LOCF for the $6 cost of
an injection. Since in 2010, DTaP/Hib is no longer under federal contract, then the only difference between
this formulary and the MOT Formulary is the elimination of DTaP/Hib. In months 12-18, GlaxoSmithKline
Hib monovalent and Sanofi Pasteur DTaP monovalent earn a place in the LOCF in order to satisfy DTaP
manufacturer brand matching. Similar to 2009, the 2PX Formulary (see Table 3.3) is the 2010 LOCF for
the $10 and $14 costs of an injection. The 2011 LOCFs are exactly the same as for 2010, with the MO
Formulary for the $6 cost of an injection and the 2PX Formulary for the $10 and $14 costs of an injection.
Table 3.4: Lowest overall cost formularies (2010)
Monovalent (MO) Formulary
Cost of injection: $6
Total cost: $275.39
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 Hib
Month 4 Hib
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 HepB
Month 12-18 Hib
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV
Month 4 DTaP, IPV
Month 6 DTaP, IPV
Month 12-18 DTaP
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
3.2.2 Maximal Price of Pentacel
As observed in Section 3.2.1, for any cost of an injection between $6 and $14, Pentacel never earns a place
in the LOCF. The reason is that the price of Pentacel is sufficiently high such that there are always other
vaccine alternatives that can satisfy the RCIS at an overall lower cost. For example, in 2009, when the
original price of Pentacel was $52.24, it never earned a place in the LOCF. This section examines the
maximal price of Pentacel for a fixed cost of an injection when no extraimmunization is allowed for HepB
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and when extraimmunization in HepB is permitted.
Without HepB Extraimmunization
Table 3.5 shows the maximal price of Pentacel for 2009 federal contract prices. The results of Table 3.5
indicate that at $52.24, with Pediarix at $48.75, Pentacel was overpriced. Unless the price of Pentacel was
lowered from its original price, there was no incentive for healthcare providers to build their formularies with
Pentacel as the backbone when they were able to satisfy the RCIS using formularies with Pediarix as its
backbone for higher costs of injections or the monovalent formularies for lower costs of injections. For a $6,
$10, and $14 cost of an injection, the maximal price of Pentacel is $43.78, $46.64, and $47.97, respectively,
which results in the 3-shot Pentacel and DTaP/Hib (3PLT) Formulary as the LOCF. This formulary is so
named because the backbone of the formulary is the three injections of Pentacel at months 2, 4, and 6, and
one injection of DTaP/Hib at months 12-18. By the design of a LOCF, if a penny is added to the maximal
price of Pentacel, then Pentacel no longer earns a place in the LOCF. In this case, the LOCFs are the MOT
Formulary for a $6 cost of an injection and the 2PX Formulary for $10 and $14 costs of an injection (see
Table 3.3).
Table 3.5: Maximal price of Pentacel (2009)
Cost Maximal Total
of price cost
injection of Pentacel
$6.00 $43.78 $269.16
$10.00 $46.64 $313.74
$14.00 $47.97 $353.73
3-shot Pentacel and DTaP/Hib (3PLT) Formulary
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 HepB
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 Pentacel
Month 4 Pentacel
Month 6 Pentacel
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
In 2010, the original price of Pentacel was reduced to $51.45. At this price, Pentacel never earns a place
in the LOCF. Table 3.6 shows the maximal prices of Pentacel for 2010 federal contract prices. At the $6 and
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$10 cost of an injection, the maximal prices for Pentacel are $44.66 and $45.84, respectively, which results in
the 3-shot Pentacel (3PL) Formulary as the LOCF. The 3PL formulary is so named because the backbone
of the formulary is three shots of Pentacel. In 2010, DTaP/Hib was no longer under federal contract, and
hence, Sanofi Pasteur DTaP and GlaxoSmithKline Hib monovalents are administered in months 12-18 (since
they are the least expensive DTaP and Hib monovalents). For a $14 cost of an injection, Pentacel needed to
be priced at $47.06, so that the 3-shot Pentacel and Hib-HepB (3PLC) Formulary is the LOCF. The 3PLC
formulary is so named because of three injections of Pentacel at months 2, 4, and 6, and an injection of
Merck Hib-HepB at months 12-18.
If a penny is added to the maximal prices of Pentacel, then Pentacel no longer earns a place in the LOCF.
In this case, the LOCFs are the MO Formulary for a $6 cost of an injection (see Table 3.4) and the 2PX
Formulary for $10 and $14 costs of an injection (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.6: Maximal price of Pentacel (2010)
Cost Maximal Total
of price of cost
injection Pentacel
$6.00 $44.66 $275.38
$10.00 $45.84 $318.92
$14.00 $47.06 $358.92
3-shot
Pentacel
(3PL) Formulary
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 HepB
Month 12-18
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 Pentacel
Month 4 Pentacel
Month 6 Pentacel
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
3-shot
Pentacel
and Hib-HepB
(3PLC) Formulary
Vaccine
-
-
-
-
Hib-HepB
-
HepB
HepB
-
-
-
-
-
Pentacel
Pentacel
Pentacel
DTaP
DTaP, IPV
In 2011, the original price of Pentacel was $53.30. At this price, Pentacel never earned a place in the
LOCF. Table 3.7 indicates the maximal prices of Pentacel for 2011 federal contract prices, for a fixed cost
of an injection. The LOCFs are the same as 2010 for costs of an injections $6, $10, and $14. If a penny is
added to the maximal prices of Pentacel, then Pentacel no longer earns a place in the LOCF. In this case,
the LOCFs are also the same as 2010.
Figure 3.1 shows the maximal price of Pentacel for any cost of an injection between $6 and $14 for 2009,
2010, and 2011. In 2009, as the cost of an injection increases, the maximal price of Pentacel increases as
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Table 3.7: Maximal price of Pentacel (2011)
Cost Maximal Total
of an price of cost
injection Pentacel
$6.00 $44.97 $277.16
$10.00 $47.71 $325.30
$14.00 $49.05 $365.32
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Figure 3.1: Maximal price of Pentacel with respect to
cost of an injection (2009, 2010, and 2011)
well, which is reasonable since for higher costs of an injection, more expensive combination vaccines (such
as Pentacel) are likely to earn a place in the LOCF. The slope of the increase in Pentacel maximal prices
changes at $7.14 cost of an injection, which is the breakpoint between the MOT Formulary and the 2PX
Formulary. In 2010, as the cost of an injection increases, the maximal price of Pentacel increases for any cost
of an injection between $6 and $6.70, after which it remains constant for any cost of an injection between
$6.70 and $10.40, and then shifts up with a smaller slope. The LOCF with maximal price of Pentacel for
any cost of an injection between $6.70 and $10.40 is the 3PL Formulary. The LOCF with original price of
Pentacel for any cost of an injection between $6.70 and $10.40 is the 2PX Formulary. These two formularies
have the same cost, i.e., the 2PX Formulary is an alternative LOCF for the 3PL Formulary for any cost
of an injection between $6.70 and $10.40. Existence of an alternative LOCF is the reason for the constant
slope of the maximal prices of Pentacel for any cost of an injection between $6.70 and $10.40. The trend for
2011 is similar to 2010. As shown in Figure 3.1, since the original price of Pentacel is the highest in 2011
across the three years, the maximal prices of Pentacel in 2011 are greater than 2009 and 2010. In 2010, the
original price of Pentacel is lower than the original price of Pentacel in 2009. However, since DTaP/Hib was
under federal contract in 2009, the maximal price of Pentacel is higher for the lower costs of an injection.
Based on these analyses, Pentacel is not competitively priced compared to Pediarix. A strategy for Sanofi
Pasteur in 2009-2011 would have been to decrease the price of Pentacel based on the results of Tables 3.5, 3.6
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and Table 3.7, respectively so that Pentacel earns a place in the LOCF. Besides Pentacel being overpriced,
another possibility is that Pediarix is underpriced. GlaxoSmithKline can increase the price of Pediarix with
it still being competitive relative to Pentacel. The analyses of this section give some insights to Sanofi
Pasteur and GlaxoSmithKline for pricing strategies of Pentacel and Pediarix in future years.
With HepB Extraimmunization
Suppose extraimmunization is permitted for the HepB vaccine (i.e., HepB can be administered at birth and
months 2, 4, and 6). Then the 3-shot Pediarix and DTaP-IPV (3PXK) Formulary (see Table 3.8), which
permits extraimmunization for HepB and contains no Sanofi Pasteur vaccines is introduced. For 2009 federal
contract prices, for any cost of an injection greater than or equal to $23.25 (defined as the 2009 threshold
cost of an injection), the 3PXK formulary is the LOCF with Pediarix and Pentacel original prices. However,
if the price of Pentacel decreased to $50.35 ($1.89 less than its original price of $52.24), Pentacel would have
always earned a place in the LOCF (3PLT Formulary (see Table 3.5)) for any cost of an injection above the
$23.25 threshold. The same condition holds in 2010, and 2011, with threshold costs of an injection set at
$23.02, and $23.59, respectively. In order for Pentacel to earn a place in the LOCF (3PLC Formulary (see
Table 3.6)) for any cost of an injection greater than the threshold costs of an injection in 2010, and 2011,
the price of Pentacel would have needed to decrease to $50.06 ($1.39 less than its original price), and $52.24
($1.06 less than its original price), respectively.
Based on the results of this section, with the original prices of Pediarix and Pentacel, Pentacel would
have never earned a place in the LOCF for any cost of an injection.
Reducing the price of all the vaccines of a certain manufacturing company (i.e., Sanofi Pasteur) by a
specified percentage as opposed to only reducing the price of Pentacel, changes the LOCF based on the
percentage price reduction. Increasing the percentage price reduction of all the Sanofi Pasteur vaccines
shifts the LOCF to the formulary in which all the required competitive antigens except HepB are obtained
from Sanofi Pasteur.
3.2.3 Significant Savings
This section focuses on the maximal prices of Pentacel, given the original prices of all the other vaccines, for
which the total cost of the LOCF is significantly lower. For 2011 federal contract prices, the results in Table
3.7 show that for a $6 cost of an injection, the maximal price of Pentacel is $44.97 and the 3PL Formulary
(see Table 3.6) is the LOCF with total cost of $277.16. For the original price of Pentacel in 2011, $53.30,
the LOCF is the MO Formulary (see Table 3.4) with total cost $277.19. Therefore, a $8.33 reduction in the
20
Table 3.8: Lowest overall cost formulary with HepB extraimmunization
3-shot Pediarix and DTaP-IPV (3PXK) Formulary
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 Hib
Month 4 Hib
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 Pediarix
Month 4 Pediarix
Month 6 Pediarix
Month 12-18 DTaP, Hib
Month 48-72 DTaP-IPV
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
price of Pentacel results in a decrease of $0.03 in the total cost. Figure 3.2 (a) shows a reduction in the total
cost of the LOCF with respect to the maximal price of Pentacel for a $6 cost of an injection. From Figure
3.2 (a), if the price of Pentacel was lowered to $40.00, then the reduction in the total cost of the LOCF was
$14.94.
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Figure 3.2: Reduction in total cost of the LOCF with respect to maximal price of Pentacel (a) Cost of an injection $6
(b) Cost of an injection $10 (c) Cost of an injection $14
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Figure 3.2 (b) shows a reduction in the total cost of the LOCF with respect to the maximal price of
Pentacel for a $10 cost of an injection. In general, the lower the price of Pentacel, the higher the savings.
Figure 3.2 (c) shows a reduction in the total cost of the LOCF with respect to the maximal price of Pentacel
for a $14 cost of an injection.
3.2.4 Vaccine Shortages
Vaccine shortages occur when the amount of a certain vaccine production is not sufficient for the birth
cohort. Vaccine shortages can affect certain areas of the country or the whole country and may last from
a few days to several years. Several scenarios may lead to vaccine shortages. For example, a manufacturer
may not be able to produce a vaccine fast enough to meet demand, a manufacturer may stop producing a
vaccine for business and safety reasons, or a vaccine suppliers may not be able to send out a vaccine quickly
enough. A combination of these factors may cause a vaccine shortage as well. For example, production of
Merck Hib and Merck Hib-HepB were temporarily suspended on December 13, 2007 due to the fact that
Merck couldn’t assure sterility of these vaccines [42] and therefore a Hib vaccine shortage occurred in the
United States during December 2007-September 2009 ([10] and [12]). This section studies the conditions in
which there is a shortage of one of the monovalent vaccines in 2011 pediatric vaccine market.
Hib Shortage
Suppose the Hib monovalent vaccine is not available in the market. The LOCF for a $6 cost of an injection
is the 2-shot Hib-HepB (2CO) Formulary (see Table 3.9). In this formulary, two Hib-HepB doses are admin-
istered in month 2 and months 12-18. Pentacel earns a place in the LOCF, to be administered in months 4
and 6. Of the GlaxoSmithKline vaccines, only one dose of HepB earns a place in the LOCF (a birth dose).
To satisfy the DTaP manufacturer brand matching, the Sanofi Pasteur DTaP monovalent earns a place in
the LOCF. The LOCF for a $10 or $14 cost of an injection is the 3PLC Formulary (see Table 3.6).
HepB Shortage
Suppose the HepB monovalent vaccine is not available in the market. The LOCF for a $6 cost of an injection
is the 3-shot Pediarix (3PX) Formulary (see Table 3.9). Since no combination vaccine can be administered
at birth and the HepB monovalent is not available due to the shortage, a HepB birth dose will not be
administered. Instead, three doses of Pediarix earn a place in the LOCF to be administered in months 2, 4,
and 6. To satisfy the DTaP manufacturer brand matching, the GlaxoSmithKline DTaP monovalent earns a
place in the LOCF. The LOCF for the $10 and $14 costs of an injection is the 3PXK Formulary (see Table
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Table 3.9: Lowest overall cost formularies under the shortage of monovalent vaccines (2011)
Hib Shortage
2-shot Hib-HepB
(2CO) Formulary
Cost of injection: $6
Total cost: $305.14
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 Hib-HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 Hib-HepB
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV
Month 4 Pentacel
Month 6 Pentacel
Month 12-18 DTaP
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
HepB Shortage
3-shot Pediarix
(3PX) Formulary
Cost of injection: $6
Total cost: $285.63
Vaccine
-
Hib
Hib
-
-
-
-
Pediarix
Pediarix
Pediarix
DTaP, Hib
DTaP
-
-
-
-
-
IPV
DTaP Shortage
5-shot Pentacel
(3PL) Formulary
Cost of injection: $6, ($10), ($14)
Total cost: $346.30, ($378.30), ($410.30)
Vaccine
-
-
-
-
-
-
HepB
HepB
-
HepB
-
-
-
Pentacel
Pentacel
Pentacel
Pentacel
Pentacel
3.8). A $10 or $14 cost of an injection is sufficiently high such that in addition to three doses of Pediarix, a
dose of DTaP-IPV earns a place in the LOCF.
IPV Shortage
Suppose the IPV monovalent vaccine is not available in the market. The LOCF for $6, $10, and $14 costs
of an injection is the 3PXK Formulary (see Table 3.8). With an IPV monovalent vaccine shortage, the only
choice for the fourth IPV dose is DTaP-IPV. To administer DTaP-IPV, either Pediarix or GlaxoSmithKline
DTaP needs to earn a place in the LOCF for the primary months. Therefore Pediarix is administered rather
than Pentacel, even though both contain IPV antigen, and hence, Pentacel never earns a place in the LOCF
during an IPV shortage, even if its price is significantly lower.
DTaP Shortage
Suppose the DTaP monovalent vaccine is not available in the market. The LOCF for $6, $10, and $14 costs
of an injection is the 5-shot Pentacel (5PL) Formulary (see Table 3.9). In the 5PL Formulary, since no DTaP
monovalent is available, Pentacel earns a place in the LOCF to be administered in months 2, 4, 6, 12-18,
and 48-72, resulting in extraimmunization for IPV and Hib.
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3.3 Conclusions and Limitations
This chapter uses a methodology for analyzing pricing strategies for the United States pediatric combination
vaccines. Operations research techniques have been used to find the LOCF for three fixed costs of an injection,
for vaccine prices under federal contracts in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Sensitivity analyses are presented on the
price of combination vaccine Pentacel and on the price of all the Sanofi Pasteur vaccines. According to these
analyses, prices for Pentacel have been determined for a fixed cost of an injection so that it is more likely for
healthcare providers to switch to formularies with Pentacel as their backbones. These discussions provide
insight into how Pentacel and as a result, Pediarix, impact the United States pediatric vaccine market.
Since both of these combination vaccines cannot be present in the same vaccine formulary, the natural
market tendency will be to move towards the combination vaccine, resulting in the LOCF. The results of
this chapter show that Pentacel was not competitively priced compared to Pediarix, for federal contract
prices 2009, 2010, and 2011. The changes in the LOCF based on the price of Pentacel in 2009, 2010, and
2011 provide insights for Sanofi Pasteur and GlaxoSmithKline in setting pricing strategies for Pentacel and
Pediarix in future years. Also, this chapter introduces the market conditions, in which there is a shortage
of one of the monovalent vaccines for the four monovalent vaccines. The LOCFs for a fixed cost of injection
are found in each case.
There is a history of research on pricing strategies for pediatric vaccine market. The results of these
studies, including the current study suggest that Pentacel was overpriced compared to Pediarix in years
2009-2011. However, Pentacel was frequently administered by healthcare providers during these years.
Healthcare providers may not exactly follow the recommendations of this study due to several reasons. One
possible reason is that healthcare providers may be ignoring the Merck Hib advantage (i.e., administering
Merck Hib in months 2 and 4 implies that the month 6 dose is not required). Taking the Merck Hib advantage
into account, Pentacel has a lower chance to earn a place in the LOCF. Ignoring the Merck Hib advantage
and using Pentacel to satisfy the Hib required doses could be a reason for Pentacel to earn a place in the
formulary.
As the complexity of the RCIS increases in future years, pharmaceutical companies are likely to introduce
new combination vaccines, and as these new combination vaccines gain FDA approval and enter the market,
the analyses and methodology reported in this section provides a resource for pediatric vaccine purchasers
and suppliers to determine the LOCFs. The results of this study should interest both pediatric vaccine
purchasers, who seek information regarding the LOCFs, as well as vaccine manufacturing companies for
pricing strategies of pediatric vaccines.
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Chapter 4
The Relationship between Pediatric
Combination Vaccines
and Market Effects
Chapter 3 reports and discusses the LOCFs across three years (2009-2011) for several fixed cost of an
injection values. From Chapter 3, Pentacel was not competitively priced compared to Pediarix in 2009-2011
(i.e., Pentacel did not earn a place in the LOCF for any cost of an injection). According to data provided by
the [4], [5] and [6], the net number (defined as the total number of vaccines distributed minus any return) of
Pentacel doses distributed in 2009-2011 is greater than the number of Pediarix doses distributed. A natural
question to ask is, why is the uptake by healthcare providers who administer Pediarix or Pentacel as the
backbone of their pediatric formularies not consistent with the results reported in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
answers this question by considering the effects of two issues: a special property of the Merck Hib (i.e., a
month 6 dose of Hib is not required if Merck Hib is administered in months 2 and 4) and the HepB birth
dose. Moreover, this chapter identifies the equilibrium cost of an injection (defined as the minimum cost of
an injection for which Pentacel earns a place in the LOCF) for the four possible scenarios associated with
recognizing or ignoring these two issues by healthcare providers in designing the LOCF. No attempt has been
made before to characterize the effects of the special property of the Merck Hib and HepB birth dose on
the uptake of Pediarix and Pentacel. Understanding the market factors that impact the uptake of pediatric
combination vaccines could interest those within the pediatric healthcare community, such as pharmaceutical
companies seeking right pricing strategies for their products, as well as the CDC negotiating vaccine prices
with manufacturers and government and public health officials seeking the LOCF for the children in their
administrative area.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 gives an overview of the model. Section 4.2 reports
the results based on the model and assumptions discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.3 discusses the results
presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.4 presents concluding comments and limitations of the study.
4.1 Methods: Model Overview and Assumptions
The methodology and assumptions used in this chapter is the same as Chapter 3. According to the RCIS
[14] and the dosage guidelines, a month 6 dose of Hib is not required if Merck Hib is administered in
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months 2 and 4. This feature is referred to as the Merck Hib Advantage (MHibA). When the LOCF is
determined, it takes this dose reduction into account and reduces the economic value of any vaccine that
includes a third Hib antigen administered in month 6. Therefore, when the MHibA is recognized (by the
state and local government public health officials when designing the LOCF), the economic value of Pentacel
is reduced, since the additional Hib antigen administered in Pentacel has no economic value when three doses
are administered. This devalues Pentacel relative to Pediarix. Given that Pediarix can satisfy the required
doses of DTaP, HepB, and IPV in months 2, 4, and 6, then if the MHibA is recognized in designing the
LOCF, Pentacel faces an economic obstacle to earn a place in the LOCF (at its federal contract price). The
question is, what if the MHibA is ignored by healthcare providers? Can Pentacel then earn a place in the
LOCF at its federal contract price, and if yes, what is the resulting equilibrium cost of an injection at which
this occurs?
According to the RCIS [14], a monovalent HepB birth dose is administered to all newborns prior to
hospital discharge. If healthcare providers do not include the cost of this HepB birth dose when determining
the LOCF and administer three doses of HepB in months 2, 4, and 6, HepB extraimmunization occurs.
This RCIS recommendation will be referred to as the HepB Birth Dose Administration Cost (HepBBDAC).
When the LOCF is determined, it takes this extraimmunization into account and reduces the economic value
of any combination vaccine that includes an extra HepB antigen when administered. Therefore, when the
HepB birth dose is recognized (by the state and local government public health officials when designing the
LOCF) as extraimmunization, the economic value of Pediarix is reduced, since the additional HepB antigen
administered in Pediarix has no economic value. This devalues Pediarix relative to Pentacel. One can ask,
what if the HepBBDAC is recognized by healthcare providers? Can Pentacel then earn a place in the LOCF
(at its federal contract price), and if yes, what is the resulting equilibrium cost of an injection at which this
occurs?
4.2 Results
Four scenarios exist in recognizing and ignoring the MHibA and the HepBBDAC when designing a formulary.
Scenario A captures the situation where the MHibA and the HepBBDAC are both recognized by healthcare
providers in designing the LOCF. Scenario B captures the situation where the MHibA is ignored and the
HepBBDAC is recognized by healthcare providers in designing the LOCF. Scenario C captures the situation
where the MHibA is recognized and the HepBBDAC is ignored by healthcare providers in designing the
LOCF. Scenario D captures the situation where the MHibA and the HepBBDAC are both ignored by
healthcare providers in designing the LOCF. This section reports the LOCF and equilibrium cost of an
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injection in each of these four scenarios using the vaccine selection algorithm proposed in [73] and [43].
Figure 4.1: Scenarios A-D for 2009-2012 federal contracts
Figure 4.1 indicates the four scenarios for federal contracts 2009-2012. For each of these years, a graph
representing each scenario is given, with the horizontal axes corresponding to the cost of an injection and
the vertical axes corresponding to the formulary. As shown in Figure 4.1, in Scenarios A, C, and D, Pentacel
did not earn a place in the LOCF (for any cost of an injection) in 2009-2012. Scenario B is the only scenario
where Pentacel earns a place in the LOCF (for some costs of an injection) in 2009-2012.
In Scenario A, the price of Pentacel in 2009-2012 is sufficiently high such that there are other vaccine
alternatives that can satisfy the RCIS at an overall lower cost. Using the same methodology as Chapter
3, Table 4.1 gives the maximal prices of Pentacel for three costs of an injection ($6, $10, $14) in 2009-
2012. According to Figure 4.1, in Scenario A, in 2009-2012, the LOCFs are monovalent vaccines formulary,
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formulary with Pediarix as its backbone, and the 3-shot Pediarix Formulary (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Federal contract prices of Pediarix and Pentacel and Maximal prices of Pentacel for a fixed cost
of an injection
Federal contract price 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pentacel $51.49 $50.70 $52.55 $54.50
Pediarix $48.75 $49.75 $51.15 $52.10
Maximal price of Pentacel 2009 2010 2011 2012
Cost of an injection $6.00 $43.03 $43.91 $44.22 $46.21
Cost of an injection $10.00 $45.89 $45.09 $46.96 $47.12
Cost of an injection $14.00 $47.22 $46.31 $48.30 $48.45
In scenario B since the MHibA is ignored, four doses of Hib are required to satisfy the RCIS, even if the
Merck Hib vaccine earns a place in the LOCF. In 2009, for any cost of an injection less than $12.43, Pentacel
did not earn a place in the LOCF. For any cost of an injection greater than or equal to $12.43, Pentacel
would have earned a place in the LOCF, which is the 3-shot Pentacel & DTaP/HIB Formulary (see Table
4.3). This means that $12.43 was the equilibrium cost of an injection in 2009. As shown in Figure 4.1, the
equilibrium costs of an injection in 2010-2012 are $11.48, $11.14, and $13.87 respectively. The LOCFs are
Pentacel dominant (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.2: Pediarix dominant lowest overall cost formularies
3-shot Pediarix
Formulary
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 Hib
Month 4 Hib
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 Pediarix
Month 4 Pediarix
Month 6 Pediarix
Month 12-18 DTaP, Hib
Month 48-72 DTaP-IPV
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
3-shot Pediarix with no
Merck Hib Formulary
Vaccine
-
-
-
-
-
-
HepB
Pediarix
DTaP
Pediarix
DTaP, Hib
DTaP-IPV
-
Hib
HIb
Hib
-
-
In Scenario C, three doses of Merck Hib are sufficient to satisfy the RCIS Hib requirements over the
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Table 4.3: Pentacel dominant lowest overall cost formularies
3-shot Pentacel & DTaP/HIB
Formulary
Pharmaceutical
Company Time Period Vaccine
Merck Birth -
Month 2 -
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 -
Month 48-72 -
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB
Month 2 HepB
Month 4 -
Month 6 -
Month 12-18 HepB
Month 48-72 -
Sanofi Pasteur Birth -
Month 2 Pentacel
Month 4 Pentacel
Month 6 Pentacel
Month 12-18 DTaP/HIB
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV
3-shot Pentacel
Formulary
Vaccine
-
-
-
-
-
-
HepB
HepB
-
-
-
-
-
Pentacel
Pentacel
Pentacel
DTaP
DTaP, IPV
month 2, month 4, months 12-18 immunization time periods, while the HepB birth dose results in HepB
extraimmunization if vaccines containing the HepB antigen are administered in the month 2, month 4, month
6 time periods. In Scenario C, in 2009-2012, for certain costs of an injection (see Figure 4.1), the backbone
of the LOCF was Pediarix. In this Scenario, in 2009-2011, the LOCF, for certain costs of an injection, was
the 3-shot Pediarix Formulary (see Table4.2), which includes HepB extraimmunization. In 2012, for certain
costs of an injection, the LOCF was similar to the 3-shot Pediarix Formulary, with the Sanofi Pasteur Hib
monovalent replacing the GlaxoSmithKline Hib monovalent in months 12-18 (since GlaxoSmithKline Hib
monovalent was not under federal contract in 2012).
In Scenario D, in 2009-2012, for certain costs of an injection (see Figure 4.1), the backbone of the LOCF
was Pediarix. In this Scenario, in 2009-2011, the LOCF, for certain costs of an injection, was the 3-shot
Pediarix Formulary with no Merck Hib (see Table 4.2), which includes HepB extraimmunization. In 2012,
for certain costs of an injection, the LOCF was similar to the 3-shot Pediarix with no Merck Hib and with
the Sanofi Pasteur Hib monovalent replacing the GlaxoSmithKline Hib monovalent in months 12-18 (since
GlaxoSmithKline Hib monovalent was not under federal contract in 2012).
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4.3 Discussion
The results reported suggest that Pentacel would never have earned a place in the LOCF with 2009-2012
federal contract prices unless the MHibA was ignored and the HepBBDAC was recognized by healthcare
providers. According to the Biologics Surveillance Summary for 2009, 2010, and 2011 provided by the CDC
on the number of vaccine doses distributed during these periods [4], [5] and [6], the net number of Pentacel
doses distributed during 2009, 2010, and 2011 was 5,724,422, 5,112,421, and 9,604,245 , respectively. The net
number of Pediarix doses distributed during 2009, 2010, and 2011 was 1,739,259, 1,829,648, and 3,444,210,
respectively. The net number of Pentacel doses distributed each year was more than the net number of
Pediarix doses distributed.
These numbers suggest that healthcare providers were ignoring the MHibA and recognizing the Hep-
BBDAC when designing LOCF (Scenario B in Figure 4.1). If the MHibA was recognized by healthcare
providers, then Pentacel would not have been competitively priced compared to Pediarix, and hence, it
would not have earned a place in the LOCF in 2009-2011. In the future, if the sale of Pediarix and Pentacel
remains consistent with the trend observed in 2009-2011, the same conclusions would be drawn. On the other
hand, if this trend reverses and the number of doses distributed for Pediarix increases while the number of
doses of Pentacel decreases, then other factors may be creating such a shift in uptake.
Due to a manufacturing delay, a Pentacel shortage occurred in April 2012 [63]. Therefore, according to
the Biologics Surveillance Summary for 2012 [7], the net number of Pentacel doses distributed during 2012
was 5,470,805 while the net number of Pediarix doses distributed during 2012 was 5,017,570. Although the
sales numbers of Pentacel were still higher than those for Pediarix, the noted shortage likely impacted these
values, since their difference is considerably smaller.
One possible explanation for healthcare providers ignoring the MHibA was that the FDA approval of
Pentacel in 2008 coincided with a Hib shortage during that time period. In particular, the manufacture
of Merck Hib and Hib-HepB was discontinued in 2007 due to sterility problems with these vaccines [42].
The resulting Hib vaccine shortage lasted until 2009 [10] and [12]. The Merck Hib shortage was a likely
reason for the higher number of Pentacel doses sold in 2009 compared to the number of Pediarix doses
sold, and the market inertia associated with staying with Pentacel rather than switching back to Pediarix,
after production resumed. The 2010 federal contract price for Pentacel was $0.79 lower than its price in
2009, which suggests that Sanofi Pasteur was proactively preparing for such a switch, which did not fully
materialize. All these points provide plausible explanations for why the MHibA was ignored, even though
it offered dosage reduction advantages. Clearly, MHibA and HepBBDAC are likely not the only factors
influencing the United States pediatric vaccine market. While there are other factors impacting the sale of
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Pediarix and Pentacel, this analysis aims at providing a possible explanation for the higher sale of Pentacel
compared to Pediarix.
Interpreting the results of this study from the perspective of manufacturers, Sanofi Pasteur has priced
Pentacel as if healthcare providers are ignoring the MHibA and recognizing the HepBBDAC. Under Scenario
B, for federal contract prices in 2009-2012, for Pentacel to have earned a place in the LOCF, the equilibrium
cost of an injection should have been between $11 and $14. This may suggest that Sanofi Pasteur has
calibrated the average cost of an injection to be in this range, corresponding to the equilibrium cost of an
injection. By pricing Pentacel as it did in 2009 and 2010, it generated $10.8M and $7.1M in additional
revenue, respectively, as a result of healthcare providers residing in scenario B.
4.4 Conclusions and Limitations
This chapter analyzes the United States pediatric combination vaccine market and provides scenarios under
which certain combination vaccines earn a place in the LOCF. The main focus is placed on examining
how Pediarix or Pentacel would earn a place in the LOCF for a fixed cost of an injection, under federal
contract prices in 2009-2012. This is examined by considering the MHibA and HepBBDAC. LOCFs and
the equilibrium cost of an injection are provided for four possible scenarios associated with recognizing or
ignoring these two issues. In each scenario, it is discussed whether Pediarix or Pentacel is the backbone of
the LOCF. These discussions are used to provide explanations for how Pediarix and Pentacel impact the
United States pediatric vaccine market. The results of this study suggest that Pentacel would never have
earned a place in the LOCF under federal contract prices in 2009-2012 unless the MHibA was ignored and
the HepBBDAC was recognized by healthcare providers in designing the LOCF. According to the Biologics
Surveillance Summary for 2009-2012, the number of Pentacel doses distributed during these periods is greater
than the number of Pediarix doses distributed, which suggests that Pentacel was the preferred backbone of
the LOCF in 2009- 2012.
There are several modeling limitations in this study. The only measure used for comparison between
two formularies is cost. Other factors that could influence whether health care providers choose to use a
vaccine include vaccine formulary inertia (i.e., where a specific formulary remains a healthcare provider’s
choice, due to resistance to change), vaccine brand loyalty, and volume discounting, all of which are difficult
to quantify due to lack of data, and hence, are not included in the model. Specifically, as a result of the
confidential and proprietary nature of information regarding the production capacity of vaccines, the exact
value of the production capacity of vaccine manufacturers is unavailable. Hence, factors such as volume
discounting cannot be incorporated into the model.
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Chapter 5
A Capacity-Constrained
Differentiated Model for Pediatric
Vaccine Pricing
Oligopoly theory analyzes the determination of prices in markets with a limited number of competitors. In
this chapter, the United States pediatric vaccine market is examined using Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition. The proposed game captures oligopolistic interactions between symmetric, capacity-constrained
manufacturers in a diffrentiated, single-product market. The demand system is characterized by a represen-
tative consumer with quadratic utility and linear demand. Nash equilibrium provides a consistent solution
methodology for describing the pricing behavior of the manufacturers. The results characterize the exis-
tence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies for the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition in an
oligopoly setting with quadratic utility and linear demand. The manufacturers are assumed to have equal
capacity in producing vaccines. Vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse
medical events for that vaccine. Using the game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for each
monovalent vaccine.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 outlines the model formulation and states the necessary
model assumptions. Section 5.2 presents a description of the proposed models and discusses the Nash
equilibrium existence results. Section 5.3 describes the United States pediatric vaccine market, indicates the
application of the game proposed in Section 5.2 to this market, reports the results and provides a sensitivity
analysis on the equilibrium prices. Section 5.4 provides a discussion on the results, presents the limitations
of the study, and provides concluding comments.
5.1 Game Formulation
This section describes the oligopoly pricing model for characterizing oligopolistic interaction between capacity-
constrained symmetric manufacturers in a differentiated multiple products market. The demand is assumed
to be a linear function of price. Other types of demand functions, such as the constant elasticity and logit
models exist in the literature. However, given the shortcomings of such demand specifications, Farahat and
Perakis [36] suggest the use of a linear demand function when examining markets with differentiated prod-
ucts. Furthermore, stipulation of a demand system must be based upon consumer theory and supported by
32
empirical indication [36]. By design, a simplifying assumption of linear demand is made, as the information
required to stipulate a well-defined demand function is not accessible. Such information would require the
observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys. More-
over, shifts in relative prices of the products under consideration would need to have occurred during the
survey period in order to properly define demand. Linear demand is a reasonable approximation that en-
ables investigation of the stated research interests in this study. A quadratic utility function results in linear
demand functions for differentiated products.
Consider n capacity-constrained manufacturers facing a competitive situation, producing differentiated
products. Let qi = Di(p) denote the demand for product i, where p is the price vector (p ∈ R+). The
following assumption (from [71]) on demand is maintained.
Assumption: For any product i, Di(·) is smooth (i.e., Di(·) has continuous derivatives) whenever positive,
where the Jacobian of D(·) is negative definite (Jacobian of the demand system is needed in order to obtain
the inverse demand functions).
Let U(q) denote the utility function on q, where q = (q1, q2, · · · , qn) is the quantity (of the products)
vector (q ∈ Rn+). The following optimization problem of a representative consumer captures the demand
system:
max
q
{U(q)− pq}.
Suppose that U is quadratic and strictly concave, given by
U(q) = α
n∑
i=1
qi − 1/2
β n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
n∑
i,j=1,j 6=i
qiqj
 ,
where β > γ > 0 and α > 0. The quadratic utility function is selected, as it yields linear inverse demand
functions (by taking the derivative of U(q) with respect to qi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n) given by
∂U(q)
∂qi
= α− βqi − γ
∑
j 6=i
qj = Pi(q),
for the quantity values for which the prices are positive. The parameter γ/β captures the degree of product
differentiation, ranging from zero (for independent products) to one (for perfect substitutes). Assuming
β = 1 for simplicity, then the inverse and direct demands, respectively are given by
Pi(q) = α− qi − γ
∑
j 6=i
qj , (5.1)
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Di(p) = a− bpi + c
∑
j 6=i
pj , (5.2)
where a = α/(1+(n−1)γ), b = (1+(n−2)γ)/(1+(n−1)γ)(1−γ), and c = γ/(1+(n−1)γ)(1−γ), provided
that a− bpi+ c
∑
j 6=i
pj > 0. Note that a, b, and c are functions of γ. According to Chamberlin [26], the nature
of the product differentiation may be either based on the attributes of the products such as trademarks and
packaging or circumstances related to their sale [26]. In studying the United States pediatric vaccine market,
vaccines are differentiated based on the total medical adverse events reported for each vaccine, which is a
characteristic of the products themselves. The manufacturers are capacity-constrained with equal capacity
k. To complete the description of the game, denote the profit of each manufacturer i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} as
pii = Pi(q)qi = piDi(p), (5.3)
which holds assuming that the production costs for all the manufacturers are constant and equal to zero.
This assumption is reasonable in the United States pediatric vaccine market, since vaccine research and
development costs are large and actual production costs per vaccine dose are relatively small. This analysis
ignores the sunk costs of research and development and only considers the actual vaccine production cost,
which is small and therefore assumed to be zero. The game Γ is given by
Γ = (n, γ, (Di(p))i∈{1,··· ,n}, (pii)i∈{1,··· ,n}). (5.4)
5.2 Equilibria Analysis
This section discusses the game theoretic solution to Γ. In the study of games, the level of cooperation
between the manufacturers impacts the solution concepts [50]. In a market where having legal contracts is
not applicable, the manufacturers make decisions that influence each other’s profits [71]. In these markets
noncooperative game theory is a suitable approach for analyzing the game [60]. In this study, it is assumed
that no cooperation is permitted between the manufacturers.
A Nash equilibrium is a set of prices for which no manufacturer has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from its own price to receive a benefit from deviating. There are two types of Nash equilibria. As per
Definition 1 (from [60]),
Definition 1. (Nash Equilibrium, Pure strategy). In Γ, a price p∗ = (p∗i ; p
∗
−i) establishes a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if for any manufacturer i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, pii(p∗i ; p∗−i) ≥ pii(pi; p∗−i), for all other prices pi,
where p∗i denotes the set of prices controlled by manufacturer i, and p
∗
−i denotes the set of prices controlled
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by other manufacturers.
Definition 1 refers to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which describes how a manufacturer will act in a
game. A mixed strategy assigns a probability to each pure strategy. Definition 2 introduces a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. (Nash Equilibrium, Mixed strategy). In Γ, a probability φ∗ = (φ∗i ;φ
∗
−i) establishes a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium if for any manufacturer i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, pii(φ∗i ;φ∗−i) ≥ pii(φi;φ∗−i), for all other
probabilities φi, where φi(p) denotes the probability of manufacturer i charging price p and φ−i(p) denotes
the probability of other manufacturers charging price p.
An important area of research is determining the existence of and the computation of Nash equilibria
[60]. Having a pure strategy equilibrium in a game is desirable since it describes the way a manufacturer will
act in a game. However, a pure strategy equilibrium does not always exist. According to Nash’s Theorem
[51], every finite game has a mixed strategy equilibrium. Therefore, when a pure strategy equilibrium does
not exist, a mixed strategy equilibrium is sought. Section 5.2.1 introduces Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition and seeks the associated pure and mixed strategy equilibria. The Nash equilibria in the quantity
(Cournot) and price (Bertrand) competition are defined first.
Assuming that the marginal production costs for all the manufacturers are constant and equal to zero,
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria are unique. Cournot-Chamberlin and Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibria are
given as follows [71]:
qC =
α
2 + (n− 1)γ , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (5.5)
The term qC is called the Cournot-Chamberlin equilibrium.
pB =
a
2b− (n− 1)c , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (5.6)
The term pB is called the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium.
5.2.1 Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition illustrates a particular type of competition between manufacturers, where
each manufacturer has a fixed capacity constraint that limits its amount of production. In Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition, the existence of equilibria is guaranteed only in mixed strategies [71]. Chamberlin
[26] emphasizes the impact of product differentiation in the study of oligopoly theory by introducing the
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monopolistic competition model. In such a model, each manufacturer faces a downward-sloping demand.
As in [33], [66], and [62], the Chamberlinian product differentiation is employed by considering the linear
demand system (5.2). The regions where pure strategy price equilibria exist are characterized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In an oligopoly with linear demand and n manufacturers, demand given by (5.2), and man-
ufacturers facing equal capacity constraints ki = k, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, a unique pure strategy equilibrium
exists if either
(a) k ≥ k(γ), in which case a Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists, where
k(γ) = α
[
1
γ(n− 1) −
1
γ(n− 1)
2(1 + (n− 2)γ)1/2(1− γ)1/2
(1 + (n− 1)γ)1/2(2 + 2(n− 2)γ − (n− 1)γ)
]
, (5.7)
or
(b) k ≤ qC , in which case the equilibrium, called the competitive equilibrium, is given by P (k).
Proof. Pure strategy equilibria can be found by solving the following system of optimization problems:
maximize
pi≥0
pi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj
 ,
subject to a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj ≤ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(5.8)
The objective function in (5.8) maximizes the profit of each manufacturer i, while the constraint implies that
the demand of each manufacturer is less than the capacity of the manufacturer. To solve this optimization
problem, Lagrange multipliers λi are introduced, with the Lagrangian functions
Li = pi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj
− λi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj − ki
 , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (5.9)
To maximize Li, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are written as
∂Li
∂pi
= a− 2bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj + λib = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (5.10)
a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj ≤ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (5.11)
λi(a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj − ki) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (5.12)
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
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If (p1, p2, · · · , pn, λ1, λ2, · · · , λn) exists, then (p1, p2, · · · , pn) is a pure strategy equilibrium. Since ki = k,
then by (5.10) and (5.12), pi =
a+ bλ
2b− c(n− 1) .
(a) In (5.12), if λi = 0, then pi = p
B =
a
2b− c(n− 1) , the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium. To find
k(γ), the profit at the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium is computed (piB = b(pB)2). From (5.1) and
by setting qj = k, (i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n i 6= j), the contingent demand is qi = α − γ(n − 1)k − pi. The
monopoly profit on the contingent demand qi is (
α− γ(n− 1)k
2
)2. From [71], k(γ) is computed by
setting profits at the candidate Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium piB to be equal to the monopoly
profits on the contingent demand, (
α− γ(n− 1)k
2
)2 (i.e., piB = (
α− γ(n− 1)k
2
)2).
(b) In (5.12), setting the expression in parentheses equal to zero and solving for λ, leads to
λ =
k(2b− c(n− 1))− ab
cb(n− 1)− b2 . (5.13)
Then for i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
pi = p =
a
2b− (n− 1)c +
k(2b− c(n− 1))− ab
2b− (n− 1)c)(c(n− 1)− b) = α− k − kγ(n− 1) = P (k). (5.14)
In this case, manufacturers are so capacity-constrained (i.e., k ≤ qC) that the competitive equilibrium
P (k) is obtained [71].
Note that in (5.12), if λi = 0 for some i = 1, 2, · · · , n and the expression in parentheses be equal to zero
for another i = 1, 2, · · · , n, then (5.11) is violated. Therefore, the Bertrand-Chamberlin and the competitive
equilibria provide a unique pure strategy equilibrium depending on the value of the capacity.
By Theorem 1, in the region qC < k < k(γ), no pure strategy equilibrium exists. Dasgupta and Maskin
[29] show that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with a continuous distribution, with support on
a price interval [p, p] (i.e., set of points that are the members of the distribution). The mixed strategy
equilibrium is characterized by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. In an oligopoly with linear demand and n manufacturers, demand given by (5.2), and manu-
facturers facing equal capacity constraints ki = k, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, if qC < k < k(γ), there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium where each manufacturer sets prices according to a continuous distribution function φ
with support [p, p] and expected profit pi. The distribution function, its support, and the expected profit are
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given by
p = arg max
p
{p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p)} ,
pi = p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p),
p = pi/k,
φ(p) =
(
k − pi/p
k(γ(n− 1) + 1)− α+ p
)(1/(n−1))
.
Note that φ(p) is the probability that a manufacturer sets its price for a product to be less than p (i.e., the
cumulative distribution function (CDF)).
Proof. By Theorem 1, pure strategy equilibrium exists if either k ≥ k(γ) or k ≤ qC . Therefore based on
the assumption, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. From [29], there exists a continuous mixed strategy
equilibrium with support on a price interval [p, p]. From (5.1) and by setting qj = k, the contingent demand
is qi = α − γ(n − 1)k − pi, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= i. The desirable price is the one which maximizes the
profits. Therefore, the supremum of the support should be the monopoly price on the contingent demand of
a manufacturer when all the other manufacturers undercut its price (i.e., p = arg max
p
p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p)),
and hence, pi = p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p). The expected profit for the manufacturer at any price p ∈ [p, p] must
be similar, say pi, provided that the other manufacturers use the φ. The reason is that, if a manufacturer
charges p, he knows he will be surely undercut and charging other than p will not be optimal. The expected
profit when setting price p is pk, and hence, p = pi/k. For any p ∈ [p, p], the expected profit is given by
pi =
(
1− [φ(p)](n−1)
)
pk + [φ(p)](n−1)p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p). (5.15)
Equation (5.15) holds since the probability that all the other manufacturers undercut the price of one
manufacturer is [φ(p)](n−1) and in this case the profit is equal to p(α− γ(n− 1)k − p). On the other hand,
the probability that one manufacturer undercut the price of all the other manufacturers is
(
1− [φ(p)](n−1))
and the profit is equal to pk. Solving for φ(p) in (5.15), gives the desired result. This proof follows along
the lines of [48], [47] and [70].
5.3 The United States Pediatric Vaccine Market
Section 5.3 provides a description of the United States public sector pediatric vaccine market and discusses
the equilibria in Γ by applying it to this market based on federal contract prices of 2010. This explores the
result of a Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition on the prices of the competing vaccines.
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5.3.1 Market Description
There are a limited number of vaccine manufacturers in the United States that contribute to the manufacture
and distribution of pediatric vaccines [34]. Pediatric vaccines in the United States are manufactured privately
and there exists a competition between vaccine manufacturers in gaining higher profits. The focus of this
chapter is on three competitive monovalent vaccines DTaP, Hib and HepB. Note that IPV monovalent vaccine
is not included in this chapter as it is manufactured by only one vaccine manufacturer, and hence does not
engage in any competition.
Other than vaccine manufacturers, there are several other stakeholders in the United States pediatric
vaccine market. The CDC is the main public health organization responsible for immunization in the United
States. Once the FDA approves vaccines for sale in the United States, the ACIP, an advisory body to the
CDC, may recommend including the vaccines in the RCIS (see [14]). The RCIS is a sequence and timing of
required pediatric vaccines to protect children from several diseases [59]. The prices of the vaccines which are
sold in the public sector are set as a result of negotiations between the CDC and the vaccine manufacturers.
The state and local government officials (e.g., local public health departments) then purchase the vaccines
for the immunization needs of the children living in their administrative areas of responsibility. Pediatric
vaccines purchased at the public sector price represent approximately 57% of the total pediatric purchases
by volume in the United States [54]. Since more than half of all pediatric vaccines produced are purchased
by state and local government officials through CDC-negotiated contracts, CDC has some negotiating power
with manufacturers [27]. In the game theoretic analysis of the United States public sector pediatric vaccine
market introduced in Section 5.3.2, the CDC is not modeled as an stakeholder; the model includes the vaccine
manufacturers, as the underlying game is a price competition between vaccine manufacturers. The results
of the model, which are the equilibrium prices for monovalent pediatric vaccines, may provide insights for
the CDC while negotiating vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers.
Table 5.1: Competitive vaccines used in the game theoretic model (2010)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Vaccine Firm 2010 federal contract prices 2010 private sector prices
(public sector)
DTaP InfanrixR© GlaxoSmithKline $14.25 $21.44
DTaP TripediaR© Sanofi Pasteur $13.25 $23.055
HepB ENGERIXR© GlaxoSmithKline $10.25 $21.37
HepB RECOMBIVAX HBR© Merck $10.25 $23.20
Hib PedvaxHIBR© Merck $11.511 $22.77
Hib ActHIBR© Sanofi Pasteur $8.83 $23.606
Hib HiberixR© GlaxoSmithKline $8.66 $22.83
Table 5.1 serves as a summary of the information regarding the 2010 United States monovalent pediatric
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vaccines, which are used in this analysis. Column I indicates the set of pediatric vaccines analyzed in this
study, along with their registered trademark names. Column II (from [18]) indicates the manufacturer of
each vaccine. Column III indicates the public sector vaccine prices (from [18]). These prices result from
negotiations between the CDC and vaccine manufacturers. Column IV indicates the private sector vaccine
prices, which is used to further provide additional explanation on vaccine pricing in the United States.
5.3.2 Game Theoretic Analysis of 2010 Public Sector Pediatric Vaccine
Market
Three instances of Γ are formulated for the competitive monovalent vaccines DTaP, HepB, Hib: ΓDTaP for
the DTaP monovalent vaccines, ΓHepB for the HepB monovalent vaccines, and ΓHib for the Hib monovalent
vaccines. Each Γ instance give the equilibrium prices for the monovalent vaccines DTaP, HepB, and Hib,
respectively.
Three different statistics are used to determine the demand function for vaccines: the number of children
completing the RCIS annually, the number of children fully immunized with the vaccines purchased at the
public sector, and the vaccination coverage rate. According to a National Vital Statistics Report, in 2010,
the number of births in the United States were approximately four million [49] (note that the number of
children less than age five immigrated to the United States in 2010 is negligible compared to birth cohort
and hence, is not included in this study [69]). Using this value as an upper bound for demand, 57% of these
children received vaccines, purchased at public sector prices [54]. The 2010 National Immunization Survey
(NIS) provides vaccine coverage rates for children up to 36 months of age [13]. To find the market demand
for each vaccine, the expected value of the number of doses given to each child is found using the 2010 NIS
data. This number is multiplied by the birth cohort of 2010 to find the total number of doses given to all
the children. To capture the demand in the public sector, the number of doses given to the birth cohort is
multiplied by 0.57. Table 5.2 indicates the market demand (up to two significant digits) for the vaccines used
in the games. The demand function used is (5.2), where the demand provided by the public sector is given
by Di(p), for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The vaccine prices are reported in Table 5.1. To find b and c in (5.2), the degree
of product differentiation γ is required. In this study, vaccines are differentiated based on the total medical
adverse events reported for each vaccine. Demand intercept a in (5.2) is then computed for the vaccines in
each Γ instance.
To capture the degree of product differentiation γ, the (national) Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System (VAERS) database is reviewed [24]. VAERS is a passive surveillance system originated in 1990,
co-managed by the CDC and the FDA, to which adverse events after administration of any vaccine are
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Table 5.2: Demand provided by the public sector
Vaccine Demand (public sector)
DTaP monovalents 3.9M
HepB monovalents 3.8M
Hib monovalents 5.6M
reported by the patients, healthcare providers, and vaccine manufacturers ([9], [53]). The adverse events
reported to VAERS may or may not be causally related to the vaccine, and therefore a segment of it may
be coincidental [52]. Despite the limitations associated with VAERS, such as reporting biases and statistical
limitations (i.e., VAERS fails to acquire data on the number of vaccine doses administered), it is the most
aggregate database available regarding vaccine adverse events, and hence, is used in this study. The events
reported to VAERS are organized by severity, from death to nonserious events.
Table 5.3 presents the total number of adverse events for monovalent vaccines reported in 2010 according
to VAERS. To compute the vaccine-specific reporting rates for each vaccine, the number of vaccine doses
administered in the United States in 2010 is computed for each vaccine using the NIS data [13] (see Table
5.3). The number of vaccine doses administered is not available through NIS for DTaP and HepB vaccines by
type. In these cases, it is assumed that each manufacturer distributes the same number of vaccine doses. The
vaccine-specific reporting rates for each vaccine type is computed for the number of adverse events reported
per 100,000 vaccine doses distributed [9, 53] (see Table 5.3). The degree of product differentiation γ is
defined as the Relative Reporting Rate (see [53] for details) among two or more vaccines, which is computed
by dividing the smallest vaccine reporting rate by the sum of the reporting rates for all the vaccines.
Table 5.3: Number of medical adverse events and vaccine reporting rates
Vaccine Manufacturer Total number of Number of doses Reporting rate per
adverse events (2010) distributed (2010) 100,000 vaccine doses
DTaP Sanofi Pasteur 181 3.4M 5.32
DTaP GlaxoSmithKline 353 3.4M 10.38
HepB GlaxoSmithKline 264 3.3M 7.88
HepB Merck 220 3.3M 6.57
Hib Merck 154 1.3M 12.03
Hib Sanofi Pasteur 648 8.3M 7.77
Hib GlaxoSmithKline 92 260K 35.38
There is no information available on the actual production capacity of the vaccine manufacturers for each
vaccine. The demand for a pediatric vaccine in a year is often proportional to the size of the birth cohort
and therefore foreseeable [56]. According to [56], all pediatric vaccine manufacturers, who are licensed to
produce a vaccine are capable of meeting the market demand. Therefore an equal production capacity is
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assumed for all vaccine manufacturers who produce the same pediatric vaccine. Jacobson et al. [46] assume
that the production capacity is 10% higher than the market demand. In this analysis, it is assumed that the
production capacity of each manufacturer is 10% higher than the demand intercept a. This results in the
total production capacity of the vaccines in one game instance to be approximately 10% higher than the total
market demand for those vaccines. Table 5.4 provides the relevant information on the model parameters for
the three Γ instances. A base value, which is used to calculate the equilibrium price, is reported for each
parameter. The low and high values reported for the parameters are used to perform a sensitivity analysis
(see Section 5.3.4).
Table 5.4: Model parameters for game instances
Description Parameter (Base value, low value, high value) Source
ΓDTaP
Number of manufacturers n (2, 2, 3) CDC [18]
Demand function intercept a (1.95M, 1M, 3M) Calculated
Degree of product differentiation γ (0.34, 0.1, 0.9) Calculated
Production capacity of each manufacturer k (1.1a, 0.1a, 1.3a)* Jacobson et al. [46]
ΓHepB
Number of manufacturers n (2, 2, 3) CDC [18]
Demand function intercept a (1.90M, 1M, 3M) Calculated
Degree of product differentiation γ (0.45, 0.1, 0.9) Calculated
Production capacity of each manufacturer k (1.1a, 0.1a, 1.3a)* Jacobson et al. [46]
ΓHib
Number of manufacturers n (3, 2, 3) CDC [18]
Demand function intercept a (1.90M, 1M, 3M) Calculated
Degree of product differentiation γ (0.14, 0.1, 0.9) Calculated
Production capacity of each manufacturer k (1.1a, 0.1a, 1.3a)* Jacobson et al. [46]
*Note: The range for the capacity may vary based on the existence of a specific type of equilibrium (see Figure 5.1).
5.3.3 Results
According to Theorem 1, if k ≥ k(γ) the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists and if k ≤ qC the com-
petitive equilibrium exists. If qC < k < k(γ), then no pure strategy equilibrium exists, and by Theorem 2,
there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where each manufacturer randomizes the price according to the
continuous distribution function φ with support [p, p]. Table 5.5 presents the equilibrium prices, along with
the profits generated for each manufacturer for the three Γ instances indicated in Table 5.4, when the pro-
duction capacity is 10% higher than the market demand. Based on the value of the capacity and Theorem 1,
in all three Γ instances, firms are not capacity constrained and the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists.
Table 5.5 indicates that for ΓDTaP , ΓHepB , and ΓHib, a pure strategy equilibrium exists for k = 1.1a,
which suggests that the equilibrium price for the DTaP, HepB, and Hib monovalent vaccines in 2010 was
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$10.39, $9.78, and $10.46, respectively. Compared to Table 5.1, the equilibrium prices for DTaP and HepB
monovalent vaccines were lower than the 2010 federal contract prices. For the Hib monovalent vaccines, the
results indicate that the equilibrium price was lower than the price for Merck Hib and higher than the prices
for GlaxoSmithKline Hib and Sanofi Pasteur Hib. This is expected as this analysis does not consider the
special advantage of Merck Hib vaccine as follows: a month 6 dose of Hib is not required if Merck Hib is
administered in months 2 and 4. Hence, the price of the Merck Hib is higher than the equilibrium price
and the prices of GlaxoSmithKline Hib and Sanofi Pasteur Hib are lower than the equilibrium price. The
results obtained suggest that the federal vaccine prices in 2010 are higher than the equilibrium prices of the
vaccines.
Table 5.5: Equilibrium prices for the public sector
ΓDTaP
k Equilibrium Price Profits ($M)
1.1a $10.39 $12.20
ΓHepB
k Equilibrium Price Profits ($M)
1.1a $9.78 $12.25
ΓHib
k Equilibrium Price Profits ($M)
1.1a $10.46 $11.32
Figure 5.1 shows the pure strategy equilibrium prices (both Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium and com-
petitive equilibrium) and the mixed strategy equilibrium prices (infimum and supremum of the distribution
support) based on the value of the production capacity for DTaP monovalent vaccine (the same trend holds
for HepB and Hib monovalent vaccines). When the total capacity of the manufacturers is less than the
market demand, the competitive equilibrium price and the infimum price and supremum price of the distri-
bution support decrease as the production capacity increases. When the total capacity of the manufacturers
is more than the market demand, the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium does not depend on the value of the
capacity, and hence is constant. Therefore, if the capacity of each vaccine manufacturer is higher than the
base case, 1.1a, the equilibrium price remains the same ($10.39 for DTaP, $9.78 for HepB, and $10.46 for
Hib). On the other hand, if the total capacity of the vaccine manufacturers is less than the market demand
(i.e., when a vaccine shortage occurs), vaccine equilibrium price will be higher than the prices reported in
Table 5.5. Therefore, the equilibrium prices reported in Table 5.5 represent lower bounds for DTaP, HepB,
and Hib equilibrium prices.
Additionally, this model can be used to provide a foundation for explaining vaccine prices in the private
sector. The demand data used to capture the equilibrium prices reported in Table 5.5 is exclusive to the
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium prices as a function of production capacity
public sector of the United States pediatric vaccine market, as only 57% of the birth cohort who receive their
vaccines in the public sector are considered in the analysis. However, vaccine manufacturers are producing
the same vaccines for both the public and private sectors of the vaccine market. Therefore a second case
can be constructed in which the equilibrium price of each vaccine is computed for the whole market demand
using the same methodology established for the original analysis (see Table 5.6). In this case it is assumed
that the vaccine manufacturers are capable of meeting the whole market demand. The difference between
the prices reported in Table 5.6 and the prices reported in Table 5.5 are $7.7, $7.2, and $7.7, for DTaP,
HepB, and Hib monovalent vaccines, respectively. These differences represent the price reductions resulted
from the negotiations between the CDC and vaccine manufacturers. The prices in Table 5.6 provides a lower
bound for the private sector prices. Compared to Table 5.1, one can see that the 2010 private sector prices,
as expected, are all larger than the prices reported in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Equilibrium prices for the whole market
Equilibrium price
k ΓDTaP ΓHepB ΓHib
1.1a $18.11 $16.98 $18.16
A third case can be constructed in which the whole market demand is considered but the capacity of
the vaccine manufacturers is equal to 57% of the market (only the public sector). This case results in the
equilibrium prices reported in Table 5.7. These prices are the maximum prices that the CDC may negotiate
for the vaccines distributed in the public sector provided that the vaccine manufacturers can only meet the
demand of the public sector. Therefore, this analysis provides a lower bound (see Table 5.5) and an upper
bound (see Table 5.7) for the vaccine prices in the public sector of the pediatric vaccine market.
Figures 5.2 (a) and (b) indicate how the region of existence of each type of equilibrium changes with
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Table 5.7: Maximum equilibrium prices negotiated by the CDC (with k = 0.57a)
Equilibrium price
ΓDTaP ΓHepB ΓHib
Competitive equilibrium Competitive equilibrium Mixed strategy equilibrium
$19.59 $20.57 [$18.16, $18.50]
the degree of product differentiation and market demand, respectively. Increasing the degree of product
differentiation (vaccines become more similar) and the market demand result in the expansion of compet-
itive equilibrium and mixed strategy equilibrium regions and the contraction of the Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium region (this result (regarding the degree of product differentiation) is consistent with Shapley
and Shubik [65]). This means that by increasing the degree of product differentiation (Figure 5.2 (a)) and
the market demand (Figure 5.2 (b)) the lower bound for the equilibrium vaccine prices exists for a smaller
region of the capacities.
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Figure 5.2: Region of existence of each type of equilibrium as a function of (a) degree of product differentiation (b) demand
function intercept
The effect of other model parameters (number of manufacturers, market demand, and degree of product
differentiation) on the equilibrium prices can also be discussed. Since based on the value of the production
capacity either a pure strategy equilibrium (Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium or competitive equilibrium)
or a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, the effect of each model parameter is studied on pB (Bertrand-
Chamberlin equilibrium), P (k) (competitive equilibrium), p and p (infimum and supremum of the distribution
function support for mixed-strategy equilibrium, respectively) separately. These analyses are for DTaP
monovalent vaccines only. However, similar results hold for the HepB and Hib monovalent vaccines.
From Figure 5.3 (a), if the number of manufacturers increases, the equilibrium price (regardless of
type) decreases. Figure 5.3 (b) indicates that by increasing market demand, the equilibrium price also
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Figure 5.3: Equilibrium prices as a function of (a) number of manufacturers (b) demand function intercept (c) degree of
product differentiation
increases. However, the rate of increase in the price is larger when the manufacturers are significantly
capacity constrained. From Figure 5.3 (c), if the total capacity of the manufacturers is less than the
market demand, the equilibrium prices (either competitive equilibrium or supremum and infimum of the
distribution support) increase as the degree of product differentiation increases. On the other hand, if the
total capacity of the manufacturers is more than the market demand (Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium
exists), equilibrium prices increase up to a point and then decreases as the degree of product differentiation
increases. The maximum equilibrium price occurs when γ = 0.3. In this case, the equilibrium price tends to
decrease as vaccines become more similar, since customers become more neutral about the choice of vaccine
to purchase. Figure 5.3 (c) further indicates that when the vaccines are indistinguishable in terms of the
number of adverse events (γ = 1), the value of the capacity significantly influences the equilibrium price.
However, when the vaccines are highly differentiated in terms of the number of adverse events (γ = 0.1) the
equilibrium prices are nearly identical, regardless of the equilibrium type. Therefore, the type of equilibrium
becomes more significant, the more alike the vaccines are. This observation is consistent with [66].
46
5.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
A one-way sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the effect of model parameters on the equilibrium
price. The sensitivity analysis is for DTaP monovalent vaccines only. However, similar results hold for the
HepB and Hib monovalent vaccines, unless otherwise is stated. Each type of equilibrium price is studied
separately. Each model parameter is allowed to take the low and high values indicated in Table 5.4. To
guarantee the existence of each specific type of equilibrium, the base case of the production capacity changes
in each case. All the four model parameters influence the competitive equilibrium P (k), where market
demand has the greatest impact (Figure 5.4 (a)) (for ΓHib (with three manufacturers), the degree of product
differentiation has the greatest impact on the competitive equilibrium). Over the range of values estimated,
the competitive equilibrium price reaches a minimum of $6.43 and a maximum of $19.30, compared to the
base value of $12.54 (with k = 0.52a).
Figure 5.4 (b) and (c) indicate the effect of the four model parameters on the infimum and supremum
of the distribution support. The impact of the production capacity on p is larger than the impact of the
number of manufacturers. On the other hand, the impact of the number of manufacturers on p is larger than
the production capacity. Market demand has the greatest impact on the mixed strategy equilibrium price.
Over the range of values estimated, the infimum (supremum) of the distribution support reaches a minimum
of $5.63 ($5.71) and a maximum of $16.89 ($17.14), compared to the base value of $10.98 ($11.14) (with
k = 0.58a). As the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium does not change with production capacity, Figure 5.4
(d) shows the effect of market demand, degree of product differentiation, and number of manufacturers on
pB . Market demand has the greatest impact on the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium price. Over the range
of values estimated, the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium price reaches a minimum of $5.33 and a maximum
of $15.98, compared to the base value of $10.39 (with k = 1.1a).
5.4 Discussion and Conclusions
The game Γ is a Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game for the analysis of a symmetric oligopoly
market. The Nash equilibrium solution concept maintains a robust approach for examining and describing
the pricing behavior of the manufacturers in all Γ instances. The analysis indicates that a pure strategy
equilibrium exists in the case where the capacity of the manufacturers is at their extreme. For the capacity
region where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium [29]. Theorem
2 indicates the distribution function, its support, and the expected profit of the manufacturers for mixed
strategy equilibrium.
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The numerical analysis of the United States pediatric vaccine market provides several interesting obser-
vations. First, assuming that the vaccine manufacturers are capable of meeting the whole market demand,
the federal vaccine prices negotiated in 2010 are higher than the equilibrium prices of the vaccines. This
observation is intuitive as vaccine prices are clearly affected by several factors, which may have not been
considered in the framework of Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition modeled in this analysis. As
of 2010, there are six manufacturing companies producing vaccines for use in the United States [18], which
is dramatically lower than the number of vaccine manufacturers who produced vaccines in the United States
30 years ago (35 manufacturing companies)[56]. This trend is due to the limited profits and high research
and development costs [56]. As sustaining high immunization levels is a vital societal need, meeting market
demand is crucial. Therefore the federal government, as the largest purchaser of pediatric vaccines, is re-
quired to provide adequate financial incentives for the vaccine manufacturers to remain in the market, while
negotiating the vaccine prices for the public sector (see Robbins and Jacobson [58]). Such incentives have not
been included in this study, and hence, the equilibrium prices of the vaccines may not necessarily be equal
to the negotiated prices. The two main roles of the CDC are negotiating lower prices for the vaccines and
maintaining public health goals by meeting pediatric immunization needs [27]. This analysis mainly focus
on the first role of the CDC. The equilibrium prices could provide insights to the CDC while negotiating the
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vaccine prices as to what will arise if the vaccine manufacturers engage in Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition. Furthermore, some vaccines could not be licensed for sale in the United States despite the high
research and development costs associated with them. According to vaccine manufacturers, the prices of
the licensed vaccines are required to be negotiated to account for the research and development costs of the
vaccines that are not licensed [27]. In addition, the vaccine production costs and research and development
costs are not included in this study. Therefore, the federal contract prices of the vaccines may not necessarily
be equal to the equilibrium prices indicated in Table 5.5.
Second, this analysis provide a lower bound and an upper bound for the vaccine equilibrium prices in the
public sector. If the capacity of each vaccine manufacturer is higher than the base case, 1.1a, the equilibrium
price remains the same ($10.39 for DTaP, $9.78 for HepB, and $10.46 for Hib). On the other hand, if the
total capacity of the vaccine manufacturers is less than the market demand, vaccine equilibrium price will
be higher than the aforementioned equilibrium prices. The latter may occur when a vaccine shortage is in
effect, which occurs when the production amount of a certain vaccine is not sufficient for the birth cohort.
In these cases, the production capacity is limited, and hence, a competitive equilibrium or a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists depending on the value of the production capacity. For example, in 2010 if the capacity of
the two DTaP monovalent vaccines was each equal to k = 0.4a, the competitive equilibrium price would be
$15.25. Furthermore, if the whole market demand is considered but the capacity of the vaccine manufacturers
is equal to 57% of the market (only the public sector), the resulting equilibrium price provides an upper
bound for the vaccine prices in the public sector of the pediatric vaccine market. In addition, this analysis
provides a foundation for explaining the vaccine prices in the private sector by determining a lower bound
for the private sector prices.
Third, the analysis highlights the importance of degree of product differentiation on equilibrium price. If
the total capacity of the vaccine manufacturers is limited, equilibrium price (either competitive equilibrium or
mixed strategy equilibrium) increases as the degree of product differentiation increases (i.e., vaccines become
more similar). On the other hand, if the vaccine manufacturers are able to meet the entire market demand
(Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists), equilibrium prices increase up to a point and then decrease as
the degree of product differentiation increases. When the capacity is more than the market demand, the
equilibrium prices tend to decrease as vaccines become more similar, since the customers are neutral about
the choice of vaccine to purchase. Furthermore, the type of equilibrium becomes more significant, the more
similar the vaccines are
Finally, given that the demand for a pediatric vaccine in a year is often proportional to the size of
birth cohort, and hence, is quite predictable [56], and the number of adverse events for a specific vaccine
does not fluctuate considerably over time, this analysis may provide insight for the CDC concerning vaccine
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equilibrium prices in the future. While the federal government officials pursue lower prices for vaccines, the
vaccine manufacturers tend to set higher prices. The results presented in this study should appeal to the
pediatric healthcare community, including federal government officials who negotiate the vaccine prices with
vaccine manufacturers and vaccine manufacturers who are seeking effective pricing strategies.
The model presented in this study has several limitations. Due to the confidential and proprietary nature
of any information regarding the production capacity of vaccines, the exact value of the production capacity
of vaccine manufacturers is unknown. Based on the fact that the demand for a pediatric vaccine in a year
is often proportional to the size of the birth cohort, this study assumes an equal production capacity for
each vaccine. Given these facts and the one that all models are approximations, this assumption provides a
reasonable framework that enables investigation of the stated research problem. There is no numerical data
to justify such assumption, however there is also no data to refuse that. There are several factors that are
not included in this study, due to a dearth of data. Factors other than medical adverse effects that further
differentiate between vaccines such as brand loyalty and formulary inertia, are not discussed. Also a metric
which differentiates the Merck Hib vaccine based on its special advantage is not included in this study.
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Chapter 6
Asymmetric
Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
Competition: A Pediatric Vaccine
Pricing Model
In this chapter, the United States pediatric vaccine market is examined using asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-
Chamberlin competition. The proposed game captures the competition between asymmetric, capacity-
constrained manufacturers in a diffrentiated, single-product market with linear demand. The manufacturers
are assumed to have unequal capacity in producing vaccines. The model completely characterizes the unique
pure strategy equilibrium in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition in an oligopoly setting. In
addition, the complete characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium is provided for a duopoly setting.
Some general properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium in an oligopoly setting are discussed. Vaccines are
differentiated based upon the number of reported medical adverse events, the number of different antigens,
and special advantages of those vaccines. Using the game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed
for each competing monovalent and combination vaccine of interest.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 presents the model overview and the proposed game
formulation. Section 6.2 explores the equilibria existence results in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
Competition. Section 6.3 demonstrates the numerical analysis, which is the result of applying the game
theoretic model introduced in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 to the United States pediatric vaccine market. Section
6.4 presents a discussion on the results obtained in Section 6.3 and indicates the concluding comments and
limitations of the study.
6.1 Model Overview
This section formulates the underlying game for characterizing the interplay between asymmetric capacity-
constrained manufacturers in a differentiated products setting. Stipulation of a demand system for a market
such as the pediatric vaccine market in the United States must be based upon consumer theory [36], which
require the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers overtime. Such information is not available
for the United States pediatric vaccine market. Given the shortcomings of demand specifications, such as
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constant elasticity and logit models, Farahat and Perakis [36] suggest the use of a linear demand function
when examining markets with differentiated products. Therefore, the demand is assumed to be a linear
function of price, which is a reasonable approximation that enables investigation of the stated research
questions in this study.
Consider n capacity-constrained manufacturers producing differentiated products. The demand for prod-
uct i is denoted with qi = Di(p), where p ∈ (Rn)+ indicates the price vector. It is assumed that for any
product i, qi = Di(·) is smooth whenever positive, in that the Jacobian of D(·) is negative definite. From
[71], define the linear inverse demand function (6.1) as
Pi(q) = α− βqi − γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
qj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.1)
for the quantity values for which the prices are positive. The parameter γ/β captures the degree of product
differentiation, ranging from zero (for independent products) to one (for perfect substitutes). Assuming
β = 1 for simplicity, then the direct demand function (6.2) is given by
Di(p) = a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.2)
where a = α/(1 + (n − 1)γ), b = (1 + (n − 2)γ)/(1 + (n − 1)γ)(1 − γ), and c = γ/(1 + (n − 1)γ)(1 − γ),
provided that a − bpi + c
∑
j 6=i
pj > 0. Manufacturer i is capacity-constrained with production capacity ki,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n, where k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kn, with the total production capacity of all manufacturers given by
K ≡ k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kn. Furthermore, the profit function for manufacturer i = 1, 2, · · · , n is defined as
pii = Pi(q)qi = piDi(p), (6.3)
which holds assuming that the production costs for all the manufacturers are constant and equal to zero.
This assumption is reasonable in the United States pediatric vaccine market, since vaccine research and
development costs are large and actual production costs per vaccine dose are relatively small [56]. This
analysis ignores the sunk costs of research and development and only considers the actual vaccine production
cost.
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6.2 Equilibria Analysis
This section introduces the solution to the game defined in Section 6.1. Nash equilibrium provides an
agreeable solution methodology for analyzing the pricing behavior of the manufacturers. A pure strategy
Nash equilibrium provides a complete characterization of how a manufacturer will play in a game. A mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium assigns a probability to each pure strategy. As stated in Nash’s Theorem [51], every
finite game is guaranteed to have a mixed strategy equilibrium. However a pure strategy equilibrium is not
guaranteed to exist. Having a pure strategy equilibrium in a game is advantageous, as it exactly describes the
players’ actions in the game. However, when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, a mixed strategy equilibrium
is pursued. Before analyzing the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition, some preliminary definitions regarding the Bertrand and Cournot frameworks are required.
If the manufacturers are engaged in a Bertrand competition, then they independently set the prices they
charge for the product, and they are compelled to supply all the demand at these prices [71]. Assuming that
the production costs for all the manufacturers are equal to zero, the Bertrand equilibrium is unique. In a
differentiated product setting the Bertrand equilibrium is given by:
pB =
a
2b− (n− 1)c , (6.4)
which is called the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium (from [71]).
On the other hand, if the manufacturers are engaged in a Cournot competition with identical production
cost zero, let
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, denote the sum of the capacities of all the manufacturers other than
i. As in [47], for each manufacturer i, define the optimal response function in Cournot competition, as
ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj) = arg max
ki
kiPi(ki,
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj)
 =
α− γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
2
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.5)
Furthermore, as in [47], define the profit (given zero production costs), associated with the best response to
capacity
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, as
Ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj) = ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj)Pi(ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj),
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj) =

α− γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
2

2
, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.6)
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Section 6.2.1 introduces the pure strategy equilibrium in an asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin
competition in an oligopoly setting. Furthermore, in the region of mixed strategy equilibria, some general
properties of an asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition in an oligopoly setting are dis-
cussed. The complete characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium in an asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-
Chamberlin competition in a duopoly setting is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Oligopolistic Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition
Consider game Γ defined in Section 6.1. The pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in an oligopolistic asymmetric
Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition is analyzed in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. In an oligopoly setting with linear demand, given by (6.2), and manufacturers facing production
capacity ki, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, where k1 > k2 > · · · > kn, a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists if either
(a) ki ≥ k(γ), for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n, in which case the pure strategy equilibrium is the Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium given by pB =
a
2b− c(n− 1) for all manufacturers, where
k(γ) =
α
γ
[
1− 2(1 + (n− 2)γ)
1/2(1− γ)1/2
(1 + (n− 1)γ)1/2(2 + 2(n− 2)γ − (n− 1)γ)
]
, (6.7)
or
(b) ki ≤ ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj), for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n, in which case the pure strategy equilibrium for manufacturer
i is given by Pi(ki,
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj), for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and is called the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Define the following n optimization problems, where the objective of optimization problem i is max-
imizing the profit of manufacturer i, while the demand of manufacturer i is set to be less than the capacity
of that manufacturer.
maximize
pi≥0
pi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj
 ,
subject to a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj ≤ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(6.8)
Lagrange multipliers λi are introduced for each optimization problem i with the Lagrangian function
Li = pi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj
− λi
a− bpi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj − ki
 , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.9)
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To maximize Li, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are introduced as
∂Li
∂pi
= a− 2bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj + λib = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.10)
a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj ≤ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.11)
λi(a− bpi + c
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
pj − ki) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (6.12)
λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.13)
A unique solution to (6.10)-(6.13) represents (p1, p2, · · · , pn) as a unique pure strategy equilibrium. By (6.10)
and (6.12), pi =
a
2b− c(n− 1) +
b
(2b− (n− 2)c)λi + c n∑
j=1,j 6=i
λj

4b2 − c2(n− 1)− 2(n− 2)bc , i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(a) In (6.12), if λi = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, then pi = a
2b− c(n− 1) , the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium,
is the pure strategy equilibrium. To find k(γ), the profit at the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium is
computed as piB = b(pB)2. From (6.1) and by setting qj = kj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, the contingent demand
is qi = α − γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj − pi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The monopoly profit on the contingent demand qi is
(
α− γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
2
)2, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. From [71], k(γ) is computed by setting profits at the candidate
Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium piB to be equal to the monopoly profits on the contingent demand
(i.e., piB = (
α− γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
2
)2, i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
(b) In (6.12), setting the expression in parentheses equal to zero for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and solving for λi,
results in
λi =
(2b2 − c2(n− 1)− 2(n− 2)bc)ki + bc
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj − abc− ab2
(n− 1)bc2 + (n− 2)b2c− b3 , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.14)
Then for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, the competitive equilibrium is given by
α− ki − γ
∑
j 6=i
kj = Pi(ki,
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj). (6.15)
In this case, manufacturers are so capacity-constrained (i.e., ki ≤ ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj), i = 1, 2, · · · , n) that
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the competitive equilibrium Pi(ki,
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj), i = 1, 2, · · · , n is obtained [71].
Note that (a) presents the case where in (6.12) all the λi = 0 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, while (b) presents the case
where in (6.12) the expression in parentheses is equal to zero for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The only remaining
case is λi = 0 for some i = 1, 2, · · · , n and the expression in parentheses be equal to zero for another
i = 1, 2, · · · , n. In this case, (6.11) is violated. Therefore, the Bertrand-Chamberlin and the competitive
equilibria introduced in (a) and (b) provide a unique pure strategy equilibrium based on the value of the
capacity.
According to Theorem 3, if ri(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj) < ki < k(γ), for any i = 1, 2, · · · , n, then a pure strategy
equilibrium does not exist. According to Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin [29], there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium with continuous distribution function, φi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, where φi(p) = Pr(pi ≤ p).
Support of the distribution φi is indicated by Si = [pi, pi]. Manufacturer i’s expected profit at equilibrium
φi is denoted by pi
∗
i . Furthermore, let p = min
i
p
i
and p = max
i
pi.
Theorem 4 discusses several properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium in an oligopolistic asymmetric
Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition. However it does not provide the distribution of the mixed
strategy equilibrium, and hence, does not fully characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium in the context of
an oligopoly.
Theorem 4. Suppose no pure strategy equilibrium exists. Then
(a) p = arg max
p
{
p
(
α− p− γ
n∑
i=2
ki
)}
(b) pi∗j = p
(
α− p− γ
n∑
i=2
ki
)
for any j = 1, 2, · · · , n, such that kj = k1.
(c) p = max
{
pˆ, ˆˆp
}
, where pˆ =
pi∗1
k1
and ˆˆp is the smaller solution of equation p(α− p) = pi∗1 .
Proof. (a) and (b) Define F as the set of manufacturers i ≤ n such that pi = p. Arguing along the
lines of [31], note that when any manufacturer j ∈ F charges p, its sales fall to less than its ca-
pacity kj . If the latter does not hold, then α − p ≥
n∑
i=1
ki > γ
n∑
i=1
ki, which denotes that for any
manufacturer i, such that Pr(pi < p) > 0, manufacturer i has not made the optimal response as it
sold less than its capacity when charging p. Furthermore, at most one manufacturer charges p with
positive probability. In fact, if Pr(pj = p) > 0, because of the jump in manufacturer i’s residual
demand, when manufacturer j charges p, charging slightly less than p is better for any manufac-
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turer i 6= j. Therefore, at least one manufacturer j ∈ F exists in the region of the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium, where no manufacturer i 6= j charges p with positive probability. Hence, there
exists at least one manufacturer that charges a lower price than manufacturer j when it charges p.
In addition, p must be an optimal response to manufacturer i 6= j equilibrium strategies. There-
fore, it must be p = arg max
p
p
α− p− γ n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki
 = Pj
rj
 n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki
 , n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki
 and pi∗j =
p
α− p− γ n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki
 = Rj( n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki), for any j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} with the largest capacity.
Now it is required to show that when manufacturer j ∈ F and no manufacturer i 6= j charges p with
positive probability, kj < k1 cannot hold. Note that at the equilibrium, manufacturer 1 will not charge a
price of P1
(
r1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
,
n∑
i=2
ki
)
, and hence, R1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
= r1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
P1
(
r1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
,
n∑
i=2
ki
)
≤
pi∗1 . Moreover, the assumption kj < k1 results in k1Rj(
n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki) < kjR1(
n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki) (the proof is
given for homogeneous products in [31] and is similar to the case of the differentiated products). The
following equation is the immediate result of the two previous equations:
pi∗j = Rj
 n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki
 < kj
k1
R1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
≤ kj
k1
pi∗1 < pi
∗
1 , j = 1, 2, · · · , n. (6.16)
Let q1(p1=p1)
denote manufacturer 1’s expected sale when it charges p
1
. Manufacturer 1’s expected profit
at equilibrium can then be written as pi∗1 = p1q1(p1=p1) . Define x ≡
q1(p1=p1)
k1
≤ 1. Then kj
k1
pi∗1 = p1kjx.
Equation (6.16) then leads to pi∗j < kjp1x. Note that if manufacturer j charges a price slightly less
than p
1
, say p−
1
, it sells its whole capacity kj . Therefore, pij(pj = p
−
1
) = p
1
kj ≥ kjp1x > pi∗j , which is
a contradiction. Therefore, it must be p = arg max
p
p
(
α− p− γ
n∑
i=2
ki
)
= P1
(
r1
(
n∑
i=2
ki
)
,
n∑
i=2
ki
)
and pi∗j = Rj(
n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki) = p
(
α− p− γ
n∑
i=2
ki
)
for any j such that kj = k1. These hold true when
k1 > kj for every j 6= 1 as then it must be that 1 ∈ F and no manufacturer j 6= 1 charges p with
positive probability. The case remaining is when kj = k1 for some j 6= 1. By setting kj = k1 for any
j ∈ F for which no i 6= j charges p with positive probability, the aforementioned contradiction does
not arise. Moreover, pi∗j = Rj(
n∑
i=1,i6=j
ki) for some j: kj = k1. In fact, if this does not hold, and hence,
1 ∈ F , but pi∗j > pi∗1 = R1(
n∑
i=2
ki) for some j: kj = k1. Likewise, by charging p
−
j
, manufacturer 1 would
sell k1, and hence, pi1(p1 = pj) = pjk1 ≥ pi∗j > pi∗1 .
(c) If p < p < max
{
pˆ, ˆˆp
}
, then pi1(p) ≤ pmin {(α− p), k1} < pi∗1 = pˆk1 = ˆˆp(α − ˆˆp). Therefore, p ≥
max
{
pˆ, ˆˆp
}
. Furthermore, if p > max
{
pˆ, ˆˆp
}
, then pi1(p
−) > pi∗1 . The reason is as follows: if pˆ > ˆˆp,
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then α− ˆˆp > k1, and since p > pˆ > ˆˆp, then α− p < α− ˆˆp. Then it is either α− p ≥ k1, which results
in pi1(p
−) = pk1 > pˆk1 = pi∗1 , or α− p < k1, which results in pi1(p−) = p(α− p) > ˆˆp(α− ˆˆp) = pi∗1 . The
last inequality is correct as p(α− p) is increasing for p ∈ [0, p]. If ˆˆp > pˆ, then k1 > α− ˆˆp, which results
in pi1(p
−) = p(α− p) > ˆˆp(α− ˆˆp) = pi∗1 .
6.2.2 Duopolistic Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition
Suppose that n = 2. By Theorem 3, if r1(k2) < k1 < k(γ) or r2(k1) < k2 < k(γ), no pure strategy
equilibrium exists. The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by Theorem 5. Three preliminary
lemmas are required. By assumption k1 > k2. Note that 0 < k2 < a, since if k2 ≥ a, then there is no
capacity constraints and if k2 = 0, then the monopoly case holds. As a result, 0 < γk2 < a.
Lemma 1. In a duopoly setting with linear demand, when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, p
i
≥ Pi(ki, kj)
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Proof. If a price p less than Pi(ki, kj) is charged, then the maximum profit for manufacturer i is pki. If price
Pi(ki, kj) is charged, then the minimum profit for manufacturer i is Pi(ki, kj)(ki + kj − kj) = Pi(ki, kj)ki,
which is higher than the maximum profit gained if a price p (less than Pi(ki, kj)) is charged. Therefore the
minimum price charged by manufacturer i should at least be equal to Pi(ki, kj).
Lemma 2. In a duopoly setting with linear demand, when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, assume that
either p1 > p2, or that p1 = p2 and p2 is not charged by manufacturer 2. Then:
(a) p1 = P1(r1(k2), k2) = p;
(b) k1 > r1(k2)
(c) p
1
= p
2
= p;
(d) Neither p
1
and p
2
is charged by manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively.
Proof. (a) and (b) Assume that manufacturer 1 charges price p and manufacturer 2 charges a price less
than p. As in [47], define the revenue of manufacturer 1 as
Ξ(p) = p. [min(k1,max(0, α− γk2 − p))] . (6.17)
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If manufacturer 1 charges p1, its profit is Ξ(p1) (given the assumption p1 > p2 > p2). If manufacturer
1 charges any price p > p1, its profit is Ξ(p). If manufacturer 1 charges any price p < p1, its profit is
at least Ξ(p). Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, p1 must be the maximization point of Ξ(p).
By assumption, γk2 < a, and since a < α = a(1 + γ), then γk2 < α. To maximize Ξ(p), p is never
charged such that α − p < γk2 holds. To see this, assume that α − p < γk2, then Ξ(p) = 0 holds.
Therefore, p ∈ [P1(k1, k2), P1(0, k2)]. There exists a level of k for each p in this interval, indicated by
k(p) = α− p− γk2, such that Ξ(p) = k(p)P1(k(p), k2). Clearly, k(p) ∈ [0, k1]. By the strict concavity
of k(p)P1(k(p), k2) and given that arg max
k(p)
{k(p)P1(k(p), k2)} = r1(k2),
arg max
k(p)∈[0,k1]
{k(p)P1(k(p), k2)} = min(r1(k2), k1). (6.18)
If k1 < r1(k2), then p1 = P1(k1, k2), which is a contradiction (by Lemma 1). Therefore, k1 > r1(k2),
and hence, p1 = P1(r1(k2), k2) and manufacturer 1 earns R1(k2) = r1(k2)P1(r1(k2), k2). Furthermore,
it is shown in Theorem 4 that p = arg max
p
p (α− p− γk2) = α− γk2
2
= P1(r1(k2), k2) = p1, and (a)
is proven.
(c) Assume that p
i
< p
j
, for i, j = 1, 2. If manufacturer i charges p
i
, its profit is p
i
(min(α − p
i
), ki).
If manufacturer i increases the price to any p ∈ (p
i
, p
j
), its profit is p(min(α − p), ki). Since both
k1P1(k1, 0) and k2P2(0, k2) are strictly concave, moving from pi towards the monopoly price will
increase the profit, and hence, an equilibrium exists only if α − p
i
< ki and pi is the monopoly price.
This means that p
i
= Pi(ri(0), 0) =
α
2
. However, it is known that, p
i
< p1 = P1(r1(k2), k2) =
α− γk2
2
< P1(r1(0), 0), which is a contradiction. Therefore p1 = p2 = p and its value is given by
Theorem 4.
(d) As shown in Lemma 1, p ≥ P1(k1, k2). However, p = P1(k1, k2) does not hold since if manufacturer
1 selects a price sufficiently close to p, its profit is at most k1P1(k1, k2). However, since k1 > r1(k2)
and the profit gained by manufacturer 1 at equilibrium is R1(k2), this is not possible. Therefore,
p > P1(k1, k2). Now assume that, manufacturer 2 with lower capacity charges p. Then manufacturer
1 could increase its profit by charging a price insignificantly less than p. Therefore, it is irrational
for manufacturer 2 to charge p. Note that p is the infimum of the support of the interval of prices
charged by manufacturer 2, thus this manufacturer must charge prices greater than p. However, if
manufacturer 1 charges p, manufacturer 2 profits more if it charges a price lower than p than to charge
a price higher than p. Therefore, neither manufacturer 1, nor manufacturer 2, will charge p.
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Lemma 3. In a duopoly setting with linear demand, when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, p1 = p2 =
p = P1(r1(k2), k2).
Proof. It is shown in Lemma 2 that p1 = P1(r1(k2), k2) = p. Manufacturer 2 cannot earn a profit more than
R2(k1), and hence, it has no incentive to charge a price greater than p1. So p1 = p2 = p = P1(r1(k2), k2).
Theorem 5. In a duopoly setting with linear demand given by (6.2), and manufacturers facing capacity
constraints ki, for i = 1, 2, where k1 > k2, if r1(k2) < k1 < κ(γ) then there exists a mixed strategy equilib-
rium where manufacturers 1 and 2 charge prices according to continuous and strictly increasing distribution
functions φ1(p) =
(p− p)k2
p [α− p− γk1 − k2] and φ2(p) =
(p− p)k1
p [α− p− γk2 − k1] ; with common support
[
p, p
]
.
Proof. Assume that manufacturer 1 charges a price p ∈ [p, p] and manufacturer 2 either charges a price less
than p or charges a price greater than p. The expected profit of manufacturer 1 is given by
E1(p) = φ2(p)p [max(α− p− γk2, 0)] + (1− φ2(p))p [min((α− p), k1)] ,
where φ2(p) is the probability that manufacturer 2 charges a price less than p. As it is shown earlier,
α− p > γk2 and therefore
E1(p) = φ2(p)p [α− p− γk2] + (1− φ2(p))p [min((α− p), k1)] . (6.19)
Note that E1(p) = R1(k2) = p
[
min((α− p), k1)
]
.
Now assume that manufacturer 2 charges a price p ∈ [p, p] and manufacturer 1 either charges a price
less than p or charges a price greater than p. The expected revenue of manufacturer 2 is given by
E2(p) = φ1(p)p [max(α− p− γk1, 0)] + (1− φ1(p))p [min((α− p), k2)] , (6.20)
where φ1(p) is the probability that manufacturer 1 charges a price less than p. Note that E2(p) = R2(k1) =
p
[
min((α− p), k2)
]
. Equations (6.19) and (6.20) need to be solved for φ2(p) and φ1(p).
In solving for φ2(p), three possible cases exist:
(1) If k1 > α− p, then k1 > α− p. Therefore φ2(p) =
p(α− p)− p(α− p)
pγk2
,
(2) If k1 < α− p, and k1 < α− p, then φ2(p) =
(p− p)k1
p [α− p− γk2 − k1] ,
(3) If k1 < α− p, and k1 > α− p, then φ2(p) =
p(α− p)− pk1
pγk2
.
In solving for φ1(p), six possible cases exist:
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(1) If k2 > α− p, and α− p > γk1, then k2 > α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
p(α− p)− p(α− p)
pγk1
.
(2) If k2 > α− p, and α− p < γk1, then k2 > α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
p(α− p)− p(α− p)
p(α− p) .
(3) If k2 < α− p, and α− p > γk1, and k2 > α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
p(α− p)− pk2
pγk1
.
(4) If k2 < α− p, and α− p < γk1, and k2 > α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
p(α− p)− pk2
p(α− p) .
(5) If k2 < α− p, and α− p > γk1, and k2 < α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
(p− p)k2
p [α− p− γk1 − k2] .
(6) If k2 < α− p, and α− p < γk1, and k2 < α− p. Therefore, φ1(p) =
(p− p)k2
pk2
.
The only forms of φ1(p) and φ2(p), which are consistent with the results obtained in Chapter 5 are case
2 for φ2(p) and case 5 for φ1(p), respectively. Therefore,
φ1(p) =
(p− p)k2
p [α− p− γk1 − k2] (6.21)
φ2(p) =
(p− p)k1
p [α− p− γk2 − k1] (6.22)
Note that if k1 = k2, then φ1(p) and φ2(p) are equal.
6.3 The United States Pediatric Vaccine Market: Numerical
Analysis
This section analyses the application of the game theoretic model presented in Section 6.1 and the equilibria
analysis of the underlying game presented in Section 6.2 to the United States pediatric vaccine market. The
numerical analysis is performed on the 2012 vaccine market, since the most recent vaccine demand data
available is for this year. A brief description of the market is first provided.
6.3.1 Market Description
The focus of this section is on the pricing of three monovalent vaccines DTaP, HepB, Hib and two combination
vaccines Pediarix and Pentacel. Note that if a vaccine immunizes against two or more diseases and includes
two or more antigens, with any of these antigens not available as a vaccine on its own, that vaccine is referred
to as monovalent vaccine in this paper (e.g., the vaccine DTaP immunizes against the diseases diphtheria,
tetanus, and pertussis, but it is referred to as a monovalent vaccine). Note that the IPV monovalent vaccine
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is manufactured by only one vaccine manufacturer and does not engage in any competition, and hence, is
not included in this study.
The United States pediatric vaccine market has two sectors; the public sector, in which the vaccine prices
are determined by CDC vaccine contracts and the private sector, in which vaccine prices are determined by
vaccine manufacturers directly. The focus of this study is on the public sector of the United States pediatric
vaccine market. The CDC is the primary health protection agency responsible for immunization in the
United States. CDC manages the public sector of the pediatric vaccine market through the VFC program,
which provides vaccines to eligible children at no cost. A child younger than 19 years of age is eligible to
receive a vaccine through VFC program if he or she is Medicaid-eligible, uninsured, underinsured (i.e., the
cost of vaccination is not covered under the child’s health insurance plan), or American Indian or Alaska
native [23]. Funding for the VFC program is alloted through the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
to the CDC [23]. CDC then purchases the vaccines at a discount from the vaccine manufacturers. The
discounted prices of the vaccines, which are distributed in the public sector of the United States pediatric
vaccine market are set as a result of annual negotiations between the CDC and the vaccine manufacturers.
The purchased vaccines are then distributed by the CDC to state health departments and certain local and
territorial public health agencies (i.e., VFC coordinator) [23]. The VFC coordinators will then distribute
the vaccines at no charge to the private physicians’ offices and public health clinics who are enrolled as VFC
providers [23]. Pediatric vaccines purchased at the public sector represent approximately 57% of the total
pediatric purchases by volume in the United States [54]. The CDC negotiates vaccine prices with the vaccine
manufacturers. However, due to limited profits and high research and development costs of vaccines, the
CDC is required to provide sufficient financial incentives for the vaccine manufacturers in order to ensure a
certain level of profitability and to maintain a high immunization level in the nation [57].
Table 6.1: Competitive vaccines used in the game theoretic model (2012)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Vaccine Trademark Vaccine 2012 public sector price
name manufacturer
DTaP InfanrixR© GlaxoSmithKline $15.35
DTaP DaptacelR© Sanofi Pasteur $15.00
HepB Engerix BR© GlaxoSmithKline $10.73
HepB Recombivax HBR© Merck $10.75
Hib ActHIBR© Sanofi Pasteur $9.20
Hib PedvaxHIBR© Merck $11.97
DTaP-IPV-HIB PentacelR© Sanofi Pasteur $54.50
DTaP-Hep B-IPV PediarixR© GlaxoSmithKline $52.10
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the information regarding the 2012 United States pediatric vaccines of
interest in this analysis. Column I displays the set of pediatric vaccines analyzed in this study. Column II
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presents the registered trademark names of those vaccines. Column III (from [21]) indicates the manufacturer
of each vaccine. Column IV indicates the public sector vaccine prices in 2012 (from [21]).
6.3.2 Game Theoretic Analysis of 2012 Public Sector Pediatric Vaccine
Market
Let Γ represents the game defined in Section 6.1. To find the equilibrium prices of the competitive vaccines of
interest, four instances of Γ are formulated: ΓDTaP for the DTaP monovalent vaccines, ΓHepB for the HepB
monovalent vaccines, ΓHib for the Hib monovalent vaccines, and ΓPed,Pent for the Pediarix and Pentacel
combination vaccines. To find the equilibrium price of these vaccines, the following input data are required;
the demand of the vaccines in each Γ instance, the degree of product differentiation for the vaccines in each
Γ instance, and the production capacity of each vaccine in each Γ instance.
Demand for each vaccine of interest is extracted from the 2012 Biologics Surveillance Data [7]. This data
set provides the number of vaccines distributed each year. Using the number of vaccines distributed in a
year as an upper bound for demand, 57% of the vaccines distributed were purchased at the public sector.
Table 6.2 indicates the market demand (up to two significant digit) for the vaccines of interest. Note that
the combination vaccines are providing the demand of more than one vaccine simultaneously. Therefore,
demand for these vaccines are multiplied by the number of distinct antigens in all the vaccines of one game
instance to reflect this fact.
Table 6.2: Demand provided by the public sector
Vaccine Demand (public sector)
DTaP monovalents 4.2M
HepB monovalents 6.6M
Hib monovalents 4.6M
Pediarix 2.9M
Pentacel 3.1M
The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) database is used to capture the degree of product
differentiation based on the number of medical adverse events reported in 2012 for each vaccine [24]. VAERS
is a nationwide surveillance database, to which medical adverse events following administration of a vaccine
can be reported by healthcare providers, child’s parents or guardians, and vaccine manufacturers ([9], [53]).
One limitation associated with the VAERS database is that the medical adverse event reported may or
may not be causally related to the vaccine [52]. Regardless of this limitation, VAERS provides the most
informative data regarding the vaccine adverse events, and hence, is used in this analysis. To compute the
degree of product differentiation, it is required to find the vaccine-specific reporting rate, which is defined as
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the number of adverse events reported for each vaccine divided by the number of vaccine doses distributed
(since the number of vaccine doses administered to the children is not available for 2012 yet, the number of
vaccine doses distributed is used as an upper bound for the value of the number of vaccine doses administered).
The number of vaccine doses distributed is not available in the Biologics Surveillance Data for DTaP, HepB,
and Hib vaccines by type. In these cases, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the number of vaccine doses
administered based on the information available from the 2012 pediatric vaccine market. In 2012, Sanofi
Pasteur was experiencing a shortage for its DTaP vaccine (Daptacel) due to a manufacturing delay [63]. The
shortage was in effect throughout the summer of 2013 [25]. As a result of this shortage, GlaxoSmithKline
distributed the majority of the DTaP vaccines required for the market [25]. Therefore, the percentage of the
DTaP vaccines produced by GlaxoSmithKline should be higher than the percentage of the DTaP vaccines
produced by Sanofi Pasteur. The sensitivity analysis reflects this fact for the DTaP vaccines. For HepB
vaccines the percentage of the number of vaccines distributed by each HepB manufacturer are considered
to be equal. For Hib vaccines, according to 2010 and 2011 National Immunization Survey (NIS) data ([16]
and [17]) and based on the analogy of Chapter 4, the sale of the Hib vaccine produced by Sanofi Pasteur is
higher than the sale of the Hib vaccine produced by Merck. The sensitivity analysis acknowledges this fact.
For Pediarix and Pentacel, the exact number of vaccine doses distributed is available for each vaccine type
in [7], and hence, are used as a fixed value in this analysis. The vaccine-specific reporting rates for each
vaccine type is computed for the number of adverse events reported per 100,000 vaccine doses distributed
[9, 53]. The degree of product differentiation γ is then defined as the Relative Reporting Rate (see [53] for
details) among two or more vaccines, which is computed by dividing the smallest vaccine reporting rate by
the largest one (see Table 6.3).
This analysis uses the special advantage of Merck Hib vaccine (i.e., a month 6 dose of Hib is not required
if Merck Hib is administered in months 2 and 4) and the fact that the two combination vaccines, Pediarix
and Pentacel, share different antigens to further differentiate the vaccines in ΓHib and ΓPed,Pent. Therefore,
an adjusted γ is defined for ΓHib and ΓPed,Pent, in which the degree of product differentiation is reduced by
0.1 to further distinguish different Hib vaccines and combination vaccines Pediarix and Pentacel, respectively
(see Table 6.3). If in a game instance γ is less than 0.1, the adjusted γ is equal to 0.01.
There is no publicly available information on the actual production capacity of the vaccine manufacturers
for each vaccine, as such data is proprietary. Pediatric vaccine manufacturers licensed to produce a vaccine
in the United States are believed to be capable of meeting the entire market demand [56]. According to
Jacobson et al. [46], it is assumed that the total production capacity of all vaccine manufacturers in one
game instance is 10% higher than the total market demand. To compute the production capacity of each
vaccine manufacturer, the same percentages for the number of vaccine doses distributed are used (see Table
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Table 6.3: Degree of product differentiation in each game instance
Vaccine Manufacturer Total number of Percentage of total vaccine γ Adjusted
adverse events doses distributed γ
ΓDTaP
DTaP (Infanrix) GlaxoSmithKline 310
DTaP (Daptacel) Sanofi Pasteur 573
(Infanrix, Daptacel)
(70%,30%) 0.23 -
(65%,35%) 0.29 -
(60%,40%) 0.36 -
ΓHepB
HepB (Engerix B) GlaxoSmithKline 488
HepB (Recombivax HB) Merck 635
(Engerix B, Recombivax HB)
(50%,50%) 0.77 -
ΓHib
Hib (ActHIB) Sanofi Pasteur 419
Hib (PedvaxHIB) Merck 298
(ActHIB, PedvaxHIB)
(65%,35%) 0.76 0.66
(60%,40%) 0.94 0.84
(55%,45%) 0.87 0.77
ΓPed,Pent
DTaP-IPV/HIB (Pentacel) Sanofi Pasteur 744
DTaP-HepB-IPV (Pediarix) GlaxoSmithKline 400
(Pentacel, Pediarix)
(52%,48%) 0.59 0.49
6.3).
6.3.3 Results
According to Theorem 3, if ki ≥ k(γ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists and if
ki ≤ ri(
∑
j 6=i
kj), for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n, the competitive equilibrium exists. In addition, according to Sections
6.2.1 and 6.2.2, in a duopoly setting, if r1(k2) < k1 < k(γ), there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with
continuous distribution function φi for i = 1, 2 with support [p, p]. Table 6.4 presents the equilibrium prices
for the four Γ instances introduced in Section 6.3.2, assuming that the total production capacity of the
vaccine manufacturers is 10% higher than the market demand.
Table 6.4 indicates that for ΓDTaP , ΓHepB and ΓPed,Pent, a pure strategy equilibrium (Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium) exists for all the values of the capacity shown in Table 6.4. Compared to Table 6.1, the 2012
public sector prices for DTaP monovalent vaccines, HepB monovalent vaccines, and the two combinations
vaccines Pediarix and Pentacel are higher than the equilibrium prices for these vaccines. Furthermore, Table
6.4 indicates that for ΓHib, a pure strategy equilibrium does not always exist for the values of the capacity
shown in Table 6.4. The pure strategy equilibrium exists for the capacity pair (0.55D(p), 0.45D(p)), which is
lower compared to the two Hib public sector prices in 2012 (see Table 6.1). For the capacity values, where the
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Table 6.4: Vaccine Equilibrium prices (K = 1.1D(p))
ΓDTaP
Infanrix Daptacel
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.70D(p) $11.13 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.30D(p) $11.13 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
0.65D(p) $11.21 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.35D(p) $11.21 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
0.60D(p) $11.23 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.40D(p) $11.23 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
ΓHepB
Engerix B Recombivax HB
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.50D(p) $10.99 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.50D(p) $10.99 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
ΓHib
ActHIB PedvaxHIB
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.65D(p) [$5.28,$13.00] Mixed strategy 0.35D(p) [$5.28,$13.00] Mixed strategy
equilibrium equilibrium
0.60D(p) [$5.23,$12.50] Mixed strategy 0.40D(p) [$5.23,$12.50] Mixed strategy
equilibrium equilibrium
0.55D(p) $7.54 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.45D(p) $7.54 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
ΓPed,Pent
Pentacel Pediarix
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.52D(p) $45.12 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.48D(p) $45.12 Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium equilibrium
mixed strategy equilibrium exists, the support of the distribution function is presented. A mixed strategy
equilibrium does not provide complete information on the actual equilibrium price. However, the federal
contract prices of Hib vaccines in 2012 (see Table 6.1) are in the range of the support of the mixed strategy
distribution shown in Table 6.4. The results obtained suggest that the public sector prices of the vaccines in
2012 are higher than the equilibrium prices of the vaccines. The difference between the 2012 public sector
prices of the vaccines and the equilibrium prices reflects the additional financial incentive, which the CDC
is providing to the vaccine manufacturers.
Figure 6.1 (a) and (b) show how the region of existence of each type of equilibrium changes with the degree
of product differentiation and market demand, respectively. When the vaccines become more similar (the
degree of product differentiation increases), the competitive equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium
regions expand and the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium region shrinks. Similarly, when the market demand
66
increases, the competitive equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium regions expand and the Bertrand-
Chamberlin equilibrium region shrinks.
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Figure 6.1: Region of existence of each type of equilibrium as a function of (a) degree of product differentiation (b) market
demand
Essential model parameters, such as the degree of product differentiation and market demand affect the
equilibrium prices. The effect of each model parameter is studied individually on pB (Bertrand-Chamberlin
equilibrium), P1(k1, k2) and P2(k2, k1) (competitive equilibrium), and p and p (infimum and supremum of
the distribution functions support for mixed-strategy equilibrium, respectively). Figure 6.2 indicates how
the equilibrium prices change with the degree of product differentiation. If the competitive equilibrium or
the mixed strategy equilibrium exists, the equilibrium prices increase as the degree of product differentiation
increases. However, if the Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium exists, the equilibrium price increases up to a
point and then decreases as the degree of product differentiation increases. In the latter case, the equilibrium
price tends to decrease as vaccines become more similar, since customers become more neutral about the
choice of vaccine to purchase. Figure 6.3 indicates how the equilibrium prices change with the market
demand. By increasing the market demand, the equilibrium price increases regardless of type.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
P
ric
e 
($
) 
Degree of product differentiation 
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium prices as a function of degree of product differentiation
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Additionally, this model can be used to analyze the Sanofi Pasteur DTaP monovalent vaccine (Daptacel)
shortage, which began in April 2012. This shortage was in effect through the summer of 2013 and as a
result, GlaxoSmithKline distributed the majority of the DTaP monovalent vaccines required for the market
during this time period. The equilibrium prices for the DTaP monovalent vaccines reported in Table 6.4
are calculated assuming that the vaccine manufacturers were able to meet the entire market demand. To
better analyze the effect of shortages on vaccine equilibrium prices, assume that GlaxoSmithKline was not
able to meet the significant increase in demand of the DTaP vaccine, and hence, the vaccine manufacturers
were not able to satisfy the entire market demand. Table 6.5 provides the equilibrium prices of the DTaP
monovalent vaccines when the total production capacity of the vaccine manufacturers was equal to 40% of
the market demand. The degree of product differentiation and the percentage of the production capacity of
each vaccine manufacturer are the same as those in Table 6.3. As indicated in Table 6.5, the equilibrium
prices for each vaccine are higher than the equilibrium prices reported in Table 6.4. This is intuitive since
the total production capacity of the vaccine manufacturers decreased. In this case, as the capacity of the
vaccine manufacturers were very limited, the competitive equilibrium exists.
Table 6.5: Equilibrium prices for ΓDTaP (K = 0.4D(p))
Infanrix Daptacel
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.70D(p) $13.01 Competitive 0.30D(p) $18.19 Competitive
equilibrium equilibrium
0.65D(p) $15.80 Competitive 0.35D(p) $18.23 Competitive
equilibrium equilibrium
0.60D(p) $16.19 Competitive 0.40D(p) $18.36 Competitive
equilibrium equilibrium
Now assume that there was no shortage of any DTaP vaccine, and the production capacity of the two
manufacturers producing the DTaP vaccines were approximately equal to each other, while the total pro-
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duction capacity was 10% higher than the market demand. Three cases are considered (see Table 6.6).
Compared to Table 6.4, the degree of product differentiations increased and the pure strategy equilibrium
prices decreased.
Table 6.6: Equilibrium prices for ΓDTaP with no shortage (K = 0.1.1D(p))
Infanrix Daptacel
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of γ
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.55D(p) $10.94 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.45D(p) $10.94 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.44
equilibrium equilibrium
0.50D(p) $10.27 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.50D(p) $10.27 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.54
equilibrium equilibrium
0.45D(p) $8.91 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.55D(p) $8.91 Bertrand-Chamberlin 0.66
equilibrium equilibrium
In the pediatric vaccine market of the United States (see [4], [5], and [6]), 2009-2011, the sale of Pentacel
was much higher than the sale of Pediarix. In 2012 and 2013, Sanofi Pasteur experienced a production
shortage for Pentacel [63]. Therefore GlaxoSmithKline increased the production of Pediarix (which can be
a partial substitute for Pentacel) [25]. The Biologics Surveillance Data of 2012 reflects this fact (5,470,805
doses of Pentacel distributed vs. 5,017,570 doses of Pediarix distributed). Although the number of Pentacel
doses distributed was still higher than the number of Pediarix doses distributed, these numbers emphasize
the shortage of Pentacel as the number of Pentacel doses distributed in 2012 was significantly less than the
number of Pentacel doses distributed in 2009-2011. The equilibrium prices for Pediarix and Pentacel reported
in Table 6.4 are calculated assuming that the vaccine manufacturers were able to meet the entire market
demand. In 2013, GlaxoSmithKline was not able to meet the significant increase in demand of the Pediarix,
and hence, the vaccine manufacturers did not meet the entire market demand [25]. Table 6.7 considers this
case and provides the equilibrium prices of Pediarix and Pentacel when the total production capacity of the
vaccine manufacturers were equal to 40% of the market demand. The degree of product differentiation and
the percentage of the production capacity of each vaccine manufacturer are the same as those in Table 6.3.
The equilibrium prices for each vaccine are higher than the equilibrium prices reported in Table 6.4. This
is intuitive as the total production capacity of the vaccine manufacturers decreased. In this case, as the
capacity of the vaccine manufacturers was very limited, the competitive equilibrium exists.
Table 6.7: Equilibrium prices for ΓPed,Pent (K = 0.4D(p))
Pentacel Pediarix
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.52D(p) $79.43 Competitive 0.48D(p) $80.90 Competitive
equilibrium equilibrium
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Now assume that there was no shortage of Pentacel, and hence, the production capacity of Pentacel was
much higher than the production capacity of Pediarix (as in 2009-2011), while the total production capacity
was 10% higher than the market demand. Three cases are considered in Table 6.8. The degree of product
differentiation for each case is indicated in Table 6.8. Compared to Table 6.4, the pure strategy equilibrium
prices decreased.
Table 6.8: Equilibrium prices for ΓPed,Pent with no shortage (K = 1.1D(p))
Pentacel Pediarix
Capacity Equilibrium Type of Capacity Equilibrium Type of Adjusted γ
price equilibrium price equilibrium
0.90D(p) [$13.34,$48.5] Mixed strategy 0.10D(p) [$13.34,$48.5] Mixed strategy 0.11
equilibrium equilibrium
0.80D(p) [$18.39,$54.00] Mixed strategy 0.20D(p) [$18.39,$54.00] Mixed strategy 0.36
equilibrium equilibrium
0.70D(p) [$22.31,$55.50] Mixed strategy 0.30D(p) [$22.31,$55.50] Mixed strategy 0.70
equilibrium equilibrium
6.4 Discussion and Conclusions
The game instance Γ is an asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game for studying a market,
in which the production capacity of the manufacturers are not equal. The analysis completely characterizes
the unique pure strategy equilibrium in an oligopoly setting with linear demand. Furthermore, the complete
characterization of mixed strategy equilibrium is provided for a duopoly setting with linear demand. Some
general properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium in an oligopoly setting with linear demand are provided.
The results indicate that the pure strategy equilibrium exists if the production capacity of all manufacturers
are at their extremes. For the capacity regions where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium. In a duopoly setting, the distribution functions of the mixed strategy equilibrium for
both manufacturers are provided. It is shown that the support of both distribution functions is unique.
The numerical analysis, which is the application of the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game to
the United States pediatric vaccine market, provides several observations. First, with the assumption that
the vaccine manufacturers are able to meet the entire market demand, the vaccine public sector prices in 2012
are higher than the resulting vaccine equilibrium prices. This observation is intuitive as the CDC provides
adequate financial incentives for the vaccine manufacturers, while negotiating the vaccine prices.
Second, the analysis emphasizes the importance of degree of product differentiation and market demand
on equilibrium prices of the vaccines. The competitive equilibrium price and the infimum and supremum
of the mixed strategy equilibrium distribution functions support increase as vaccines become more similar.
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The Bertrand-Chamberlin equilibrium price increases and then decreases as vaccines become more similar.
Furthermore, equilibrium prices (regardless of type) increase as the market demand increases. Third, the
model can be used to study situations where a shortage of one or more pediatric vaccines occur. Extreme
shortage of any pediatric vaccine, which results in not meeting a portion of the market demand, increases
the vaccine prices.
Finally, the results presented in this study could provide insights to CDC officials while they are preparing
to negotiate the vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers. CDC is seeking effective pricing strategies to stay
within the federal budget allocated to the VFC program. The demand of the pediatric vaccines are often
proportional to the number of births in each year, and hence, is foreseeable [56]. In addition, the percentage
of medical adverse events for a specific vaccine does not typically vary over time. Therefore, this analysis
may provide a foundation for explaining the vaccine equilibrium prices in future years.
The model presented has a number of limitations. Any data regarding the production capacity of vaccine
manufacturers is proprietary, and hence, the exact value of production capacity of vaccines is not available.
To analyze the United States pediatric vaccine market, assumptions regarding the production capacity of
vaccines are made. Furthermore in this analysis, the only factors that differentiate the vaccines are the
number of reported medical adverse events, the number of different antigens in combination vaccines, and
the special advantages of the vaccines (such as the Merck Hib special advantage). Other factors, which
may further differentiate the competing pediatric vaccines are not considered due to the lack of data that
quantifies them.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
This dissertation introduces pricing strategies for the United States pediatric vaccines markets using game
theory and operations research techniques. An integer programming algorithm is used to analyze pricing
strategies for the United States pediatric combination vaccines by comparing the lowest overall cost for-
mularies. The results show that Pentacel was not competitively priced compared to Pediarix, for federal
contract prices 2009-2012. Furthermore, the market factors that impact the uptake of pediatric combination
vaccines in the United States public sector pediatric vaccine market are studied. Four scenarios under which
Pediarix and Pentacel earn a place in the LOCF are considered. These discussions provide insight into how
Pentacel and as a result, Pediarix, impact the United States pediatric vaccine market. According to these
scenarios, direct competition between Pediarix and Pentacel is driven by the indirect presence of the Merck
Hib vaccine and the RCIS requirement for a HepB birth dose. The results suggest that Pentacel would never
have earned a place in the lowest overall cost formulary for federal contract prices in 2009-2012 for any cost
of an injection unless the Merck Hib Advantage was ignored and the HepB Birth Dose Administration Cost
was recognized by healthcare providers in designing the lowest overall cost formularies.
In addition, vaccine pricing in the United States pediatric vaccine market is examined using the pricing
game Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin. This game analyzes the prices of the differentiated products man-
ufactured by a finite number of capacity-constrained manufacturers in a market with linear demand. The
game theoretic results indicate that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in the case where the capacities
of the manufacturers are at their extreme. For the capacity region where no pure strategy equilibrium exists,
there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the distribution function, its support, and the expected
profit of the manufacturers are characterized. The numerical analysis of the United States pediatric vaccine
market using the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition indicates that the equilibrium prices of the
vaccines are lower than the federal contract prices. The results suggest the importance of several model
parameters such as market demand and vaccine adverse events on the equilibrium prices.
This analysis only considers cost factors when comparing two competitive formularies. Other qualitative
factors, such as vaccine brand loyalty, vaccine formulary inertia (where a specific formulary remains a health
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provider’s choice, due to resistance to change) and volume discounting are not included due to the difficulty in
quantifying them and lack of data or economic models which describes them rigorously. Incorporating these
factors into the analysis would be a fruitful future research direction. Simultaneous analysis of public and
private sectors of the vaccine market is crucial, as a link do exists between these two sectors for healthcare
providers who purchase vaccines in both sectors. Studying other market factors impacting the sale of Pediarix
and Pentacel is certainly a broad direction of future research since this study only aims at providing two
possible market factors resulting in higher sale of Pentacel compared to Pediarix. One possible market factor
is the competition between Menactra (Meningococcal Conjugate, Groups A, C, Y and W-135) produced by
Sanofi Pasteur and MENHIBRIX (Meningococcal, Groups C and Y and Haemophilus b Tetanus Toxoid
Conjugate Vaccine) produced by GlaxoSmithKline. The initial United States approval of MENHIBRIX is
2012 and therefore the required price information of this vaccine is not available yet. Once such information
becomes available the competition between Pediarix and MENHIBRIX, both produced by GlaxoSmithKline,
and Pentacel and Menactra, both produced by Sanofi Pasteur, could be studied. Furthermore, analyzing
the repeated (multiple interaction) Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition is another area of future
research. The game theoretic approach introduced in this paper provides a mathematical framework to
analyze oligopolistic interactions in markets with the same general characteristics as the United States
public sector pediatric vaccine market.
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